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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
RESPONDENT/APPELLEE, 
: NOT INCARCERATED 
v. 
RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS, Case No.20041118-SC 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT. 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this case 
originating in Norris' petition for a writ of certiorari. 
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
1. Is the communications fraud statute unconstitutionally overbroad on its face? 
On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision for correctness, 
particularly where the facts are undisputed. See, e.g.. Hansen v. Eyre. 2005 UT 29, f^ 8, 
2005 WL1124534 (Utah). 
This issue was preserved in the court of appeals. See Norris' opening brief at 14-
34 and Norris' reply brief at 1-7. 
2. Did the district court have jurisdiction over felony charges filed after the 
premature issuance of the remittitur in the related misdemeanor case and before the recall 
of the premature remittitur? 
On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision for correctness, 
particularly where the facts are undisputed. See, e.g., Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, f 8, 
2005 WL1124534 (Utah). 
This issue was preserved in the court of appeals. See Norris' opening brief at 36-
39, and Norris' reply brief at 12-18. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Pertinent constitutional provisions and statutes are in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
West Valley City charged Norris in the name of the State of Utah in case number 
941004929, with four misdemeanor counts of communications fraud (R. 165, 621-22).1 
Circuit Judge Watson dismissed the case because the dollar values charged 
exceeded his circuit court jurisdiction (R. 32, 36-37, 290, 624-27, 682-684, 698). 
West Valley City took an appeal from that dismissal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
in case no. 960151-CA (R. 165, 700-702). 
While the West Valley City appeal was pending, on September 30, 1996, the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office, acting in the name of the state of Utah, charged Norris in 
case number 961020866 with eleven counts of third degree felony communications fraud 
*A11 of the informations filed against Norris in these related cases are in the 
addendum to this brief. 
Counsel for Norris has designated as part of the record on appeal all of the 
pleadings files from the related cases. For clarity, however, in this brief, counsel cited 
only to the pleadings files in the last case filed, district court case number 971008355. 
occurring in May of 1993, based on the same facts as the original West Valley case (R. 
49-53, 128, 165, 176-180). 
On December 10, 1996, Judge Palmer quashed the charges in case number 
961020866 because the West Valley City appeal was still pending (R. 166). He indicated 
that he would not hear the case until the West Valley case was completely disposed of (R. 
131). 
That same day, West Valley moved the court of appeals to dismiss its appeal, 
because the State would prosecute the same conduct at issue in the West Valley case, in 
new felony charges, but could not do so until the appeal was dismissed (R. 742). 
The court dismissed the West Valley appeal on March 26, 1997 (R. 785). 
On April 2, 1997, the State re filed ten third degree felony charges against Norris in 
case number 971005698 (R. 55-60, 166, 182-87), on the basis of the same facts as the 
West Valley case (R. 53, 55-59, R. 1860 at 5-10, 12-13, 20). 
On April 11, 1997, Judge Dever dismissed case number 971005698 as well, ruling 
that the State could not refile until the remittitur in the West Valley City case issued (R. 
34, 166; R. 1860 at 27). 
The court of appeals issued the remittitur on May 13, 1997 (R. 208). 
Norris moved to recall the remittitur, because the court issued it prematurely (R. 
41). 
On May 15, 1997, the State again refiled, alleging twenty third degree felony 
2 
counts in case number 971008355 (R. 12-21, 62-70, 189-199), which were again based on 
the same facts as the West Valley case (R. 2-9, 53, R. 1860 at 5-10, 12-13, 20). 
At the time that 971008355 was filed, the West Valley case was on appeal, and 
case number 971005698 was set for a hearing before Judge Dever on a pending motion 
to dismiss with prejudice (R. 1861 at 7-8, 16). 
Judge Reese permitted the prosecutors to file this information in 971008355, but 
informed them that they could not proceed on it until the remittitur arrived in the West 
Valley appeal (R. 156). 
On May 22, 1997, Judge Reese denied a motion to dismiss this case after 
indicating that the case was not yet his, but that he had agreed to hear Norris' motion to 
dismiss it, before there was an initial appearance on the case (R. 1861 at 2, 32). Judge 
Reese ruled that if Judge Dever ruled that case number 971005698 was dismissed with or 
without prejudice, the new case, 971008355, should be assigned to Judge Dever under 
State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) (R. 1861 at 30-32). 
On June 30, 1997, the court of appeals recalled the remittitur, upon this Court's 
order dated June 26, 1997 (R. 211). 
On October 29, 1997, the court of appeals stayed the issuance of the remittitur 
pending disposition of Norris's petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court (R. 214). 
On November 19, 1997, Judge Dever refused to rule on a motion to dismiss with 
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prejudice, and stayed the proceedings pending completion of the appellate proceedings, 
because until the remittitur issued from the appellate court, he could not act in the trial 
court (R. 166; R. 1864 at 4). 
The court of appeals issued the remittitur on October 30, 1998, upon the denial of 
Norris5 petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court (R. 124-125). 
At a hearing on December 4, 1998 on case no. 971008355, Judge Dever rejected 
the argument that the case should be viewed as having been filed after the remittitur 
issued, and ruled that the case was filed in May of 1997, and that there was nothing to 
prohibit the prosecutors from refiling before the remittitur issued (R. 777, 779). Judge 
Dever also denied the challenge to the constitutionality of the communications fraud 
statute (R. 773-776). 
At the preliminary hearing on February 26, 1999, the State moved to dismiss eight 
of the counts because some of the witnesses were not present (R. 146; R. 1866 at 176-77). 
After the evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing, trial counsel for 
Norris argued, inter alia, that the information in the last case, number 971008355, should 
be viewed as having been filed when the remittitur issued in October of 1998, and argued 
that the statute of limitations had run (R. 1867 at 210-213). Trial counsel argued that a 
case could not be pending simultaneously in two courts by virtue of due process of law 
(R. 1868 at 9, 14). 
Magistrate Palmer ruled that the date of filing was May 15, 1997 (R. 1868 at 22). 
4 
He found that Norris could not benefit from his own delays, which tolled the statute of 
limitations, and that he was not put in jeopardy twice (R. 1868 at 22; R. 232-233). He 
ruled that the charges were timely under the statute of limitations (R. 1868 at 22; R. 232-
233). Magistrate Palmer bound over on the twelve counts (R. 1868 at 37). 
The State filed an amended information charging eleven counts, again relying on 
the original police report (R. 218-223). 
Judge Reese denied Norris' motion to dismiss, ruling that the prosecution's 
charges were timely filed, and were properly filed while the West Valley case was on 
appeal (R. 1873 at 69-70). 
On September 8, 2003, Mr. Norris pled no contest to two class A misdemeanor 
counts of attempted communications fraud, reserving his right to appeal the issues of the 
constitutionality of the communications fraud statute, and the district court's lack of 
jurisdiction (R. 1814-1822). 
In Norris' appeal, the court of appeals issued an unpublished memorandum 
decision, State v. Norris. 2004 UT App 452, 2004 WL 2749484 (referred to herein as 
"unpublished Norris decision"), rejecting Norris' constitutional challenges to the 
communications fraud statute, and holding that the district court had jurisdiction over the 
case which was filed during the time frame between the date that the remittitur issued 
prematurely and was later recalled. Id. 
Norris petitioned for a writ of certiorari, and in an order dated April 19, 2005, this 
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Court granted the writ on the following issues: 
1. Whether the Communications Fraud Statute is unconstitutionally 
overbroad on its face. 
2. Whether the district court had jurisdiction over felony charges filed after 
remittitur in the related misdemeanor case but before the remittitur was 
recalled. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The court of appeals held that it could not revisit the constitutionality of the 
communications fraud statute because it was bound by State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, 
97 P.3d 732, a published decision which upheld the constitutionality of the 
communications fraud statute. Unpublished Norris opinion at f^ 5 and n.3. 
The court of appeals held that the district court obtained jurisdiction when the case 
was refiled after the remittitur issued prematurely and before it was recalled, on the theory 
that under Chase Manhattan Bank v. Principal Funding Corp., 2004 UT 9, 89 P.3d 109, 
the court of appeals' dismissal of the West Valley appeal was self-executing and thus 
provided jurisdiction for the refiling of the charges against Norris, regardless of the 
recalling of the remittitur. Unpublished Norris opinion at fflf 8 and 9. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The communications fraud statute is facially overbroad. Criminal fraud statutes 
which impinge on First Amendment activities, as this one does, must be drawn with 
narrow specificity, so that constitutionally-protected speech is not chilled by or punished 
criminally under an overbroad criminal fraud statute. 
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The Utah communications fraud statute is substantially constitutionally overbroad, 
because under its plain terms, it makes a second degree felony of any intentional or 
recklessly uttered falsehood designed to obtain anything of value, without requiring any 
intent to defraud or success in defrauding. 
Because the communications fraud statute encompasses a wide array of 
communicative conduct which is not fraudulent, but which is constitutionally protected, 
such as political satire, political speech, and ordinary interpersonal communication, this 
Court should strike it on constitutional grounds. 
Under Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Foothills Water Company, 942 
P.2d 305 (Utah 1996) (per curiam), the trial court failed to obtain subject matter 
jurisdiction over this last case filed (971008355), because the information, which was 
signed by the judge and filed before the remittitur issued properly, was void and a nullity. 
This Court should correct the court of appeals' misreading of Chase Manhattan 
Bank v. Principal Funding Corp., 2004 UT 9, 89 P.3d 109, and resultant incorrect belief 
that the court of appeals' dismissal of the West Valley case was self-executing and thus 
provided jurisdiction for the refiling of the charges against Norris, regardless of the 
recalling of the remittitur. Unpublished Norris opinion at ^ 8 and 9. 
As Chase Manhattan itself recognizes, a district court has no jurisdiction until the 
remittitur issues properly. See id. at fflf 7 and 12 (equating trial court's receipt of 
remittitur with "revesting of jurisdiction"); and at Tj 9 ("Remittitur is not an order of the 
7 
appellate court, but merely gives the trial court such jurisdiction as it needs to implement 
the appellate court's decision in the matter. Remittitur is a formal revesting of jurisdiction 
with the trial court after appellate proceedings^]") (citation omitted). 
This Court should also hold that no jurisdiction attached in the case which was 
filed after the remittitur issued prematurely and before it was recalled, because the refiling 
before multiple district court judges violated the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine, which 
prevents co-equal courts from acting simultaneously in one case. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE 
IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD. 
A. THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE 
The communications fraud statute, § 76-10-1801, currently provides, 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another 
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material 
omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by 
any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice 
is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is 
less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is 
or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is 
or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the 
8 
property, money, or thing obtained or sought to be obtained is 
or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the 
scheme or artifice to defraud is other than the obtaining of 
something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection 
(1) shall be measured by the total value of all property, money, or things 
obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme or artifice described in 
Subsection (1) except as provided in Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of 
the offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described 
in Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or 
thing of value is not a necessary element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or 
concealing a scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and 
offense of communication fraud. 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to 
bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of 
information; to talk over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not 
limited to use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, 
television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written 
communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted 
were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard 
for the truth.2 
2The 1990 version of the statute which should have applied to Norris' 1993 
offenses was the same as the current version, and differed only in subsection (1), which 
then provided, 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another 
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material 
omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by 
any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice 
is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
9 
The term "artifice" is not defined by law, but is commonly defined as "false or 
insincere behavior" or a "trick," - terms that can be used to describe any form of 
dishonesty. See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1983), at page 106. 
The word "communicate" is also given the broadest possible definition under the 
statute, and subsection (1) of the statute purports to penalize communication "with any 
person," without regard to whether one widely published utterance by a defendant might 
reach multiple persons and arguably sustain multiple charges, regardless of whether 
anyone relied on the utterance. 
The phrase "anything of value" is not defined and its application is therefore left to 
the eye of the beholder for definition. 
The plain language of the statute provides that it is a crime to devise a scheme or 
artifice to defraud or to obtain anything of value by means of false pretenses, 
obtained or sought to be obtained is $100 or less; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $100 but -does not exceed $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $1,000 but does not exceed 
$10,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is more than $10,000 but does not exceed 
$100,000; 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to 
defraud is other than the obtaining of something of monetary value; and 
(f) a first degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing 
obtained or sought to be obtained is $100,000 or more. 
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representations, promises, or material omissions, and to communicate directly or 
indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the 
scheme or artifice. Because of this disjunctive language, there need be no intent to 
defraud; a desire to obtain something of value satisfies the statute.3 
B. THE RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON OVERBREADTH 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to 
freedom of speech and the press. 
Article I § 1 of the Utah Constitution provides, 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend 
their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship 
according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, 
protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to 
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the 
abuse of that right. 
(Emphasis added). 
This Court has recognized that the emphasized portion of that provision "[o]n its 
Consistent with standard English language usage, Utah courts recognize that when 
statutes or rules are phrased in the disjunctive, this requires the selection of only one of 
the provisions selection of only one of the provisions joined by the word "or." See, e.g.. 
State v. Walker. 649 P.2d 16, 17 (Utah 1982)(in finding that incorrect jury instruction was 
actually to the defendant's benefit, the Court recognized that the statute at issue, § 76-6-
404 "requires finding only one of two disjunctives"); In re Babilis. 951 P.2d 207, 215 
(Utah 1997)(Court interpreted rule governing disbarment, which is phrased in the 
disjunctive, as requiring only one of several findings listed); Berger v. Minnesota Mutual 
Life Insurance Company of St. Paul. Minnesota. 723 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1986)(in 
interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 31-18-8, the Court recognized that "[t]he statutory 
alternatives are stated in the disjunctive, not the conjunctive[,]" and concluded that to 
prevail under that statute, a party needed proof of only one of the alternatives listed). 
11 
face ... protects one's constitutional right to express one's opinion, limited only by the 
responsibility for the 'abuse' of that right." West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 
1015 (Utah 1994). 
Article I § 15 of the Utah Constitution provides in relevant part, "No law shall be 
passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press." This provision is to 
be read in conjunction with Article I § 1, supra, and is deemed "more definitive and 
inclusive than the First Amendment [to the United States Constitution]." West v. 
Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1017 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). 
The Utah Constitution "reflects the positive attitude of the constitution's drafters 
toward a free and uninhibited press." West at 1014. 
Language which is strictly opinion is protected by the Utah Constitution. West, 
872 P.2d at 1015.4 "'An obvious potential for quashing or muting [free speech] looms 
large when [fact finders] attempt to assess the truth of a statement that admits of no 
method of verification.'" Id. (citation omitted; brackets by the West Court). '"[I]t is well 
understood that editorial writers and commentators frequently resort to the type of caustic 
Constitutionally protected opinions are distinguished from actionable fact-bound 
statements by analysis of four factors: 
(i) the common usage or meaning of the words used; (ii) whether the 
statement is capable of being objectively verified as true or false; (iii) the 
full context of the statement-for example, the entire article or column-in 
which the defamatory statement is made; and (iv) the broader setting in 
which the statement appears. 
West at 1018. 
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bombast traditionally used in editorial writing to stimulate public reaction.'" Id. at 1020 
(citation omitted; brackets by the West Court). 
Courts must strictly scrutinize criminal statutes such as the communications fraud 
statute, which may impinge upon First Amendment rights, to insure that the laws are 
drafted with "narrow specificity" so that such rights have adequate "breathing space." 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). When statutes impinge on fundamental 
constitutional rights to free speech and expression, this Court will review them with strict 
scrutiny, to determine whether the classifications in the law further a compelling state 
interest. See, e ^ , State in re N.R., 967 P.2d 95 L 954 (Utah App. 1998). "'Criminal 
statutes must be scrutinized with particular care; those that make unlawful a substantial 
amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid even if they also 
have legitimate application.'" I.M.L. v. State, 2002 UT 110 at j^ 15, 61 P.3d 1038 (citation 
omitted). 
Criminal fraud statutes which impinge on First Amendment activities must be 
drawn with "narrow specificity" so that constitutionally-protected speech is not chilled or 
punished criminally as a byproduct of or direct application of an overbroad criminal fraud 
statute. See, Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 
(1980);5 Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 961-62, 
5In Village of Schaumberg, the Court struck on First and Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds an ordinance punishing organizations for soliciting charitable contributions if 
those organizations used less than 75% of the donations for anything but the charitable 
13 
965-68 (1984);6 Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina. 487 U.S. 
781 (1988). 
"In considering whether a statute suffers from overbreadth ca court's first task is to 
determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected conduct.'" I.M.L. v. State, at f 15 (citation omitted). 
"A statute will be invalidated for overbreadth only if it 'does not aim specifically 
at evils within the allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps within its 
ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of 
speech or the press.'" Provo City v. Whatcott 2000 UT App 86, ^ 8, 1 P.3d 1113 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2000). 
purpose advertised. The government claimed that the ordinance was valid and necessary 
to protect the public from "fraud, crime and annoyance," and the Court agreed that these 
were valid interests. See, id. at 636. However, because many legitimate charitable 
organizations might use more than 25% of their solicitations for valid purposes other than 
direct donations to their identified charitable causes, the Court found that the Constitution 
would not permit the government to label such organizations as fraudulent, or to prohibit 
them from soliciting funds, id. at 637. The Court held that the government could serve 
the interests, but would be required to do so through "narrowly drawn" regulations, 
concluding, "'Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. 
Precision of regulation must be the touchstone . . . . ' " Id. at 637, quoting NAACP v. 
Button. 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). 
6In Munson, the Court recognized that in Schaumberg, the Court struck ordinance 
because there was no connection between fraud and much of the constitutionally 
protected speech to which the ordinance ostensibly applied, and then struck a similar law 
pertaining to charitable solicitation, because there was "no core of easily identifiable and 
constitutionally prescribable conduct that the statute prohibits" and thus, the statute 
unnecessarily risked the chilling of free speech. 
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C. ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE 
The communications fraud statute is constitutionally overbroad, because the statute 
is not limited to any discrete area of legitimate state control, and does not distinguish 
between fact and opinion, and thus portends to punish significant amounts of 
constitutionally protected speech. But see, e ^ West supra. 
The Utah communications fraud statute is substantially constitutionally overbroad, 
because under its plain terms, it makes a second degree felony of any intentional or 
recklessly uttered falsehood designed to obtain something of value, without requiring any 
intent to defraud or success in defrauding. See id. Thus, it encompasses a wide array of 
communicative conduct which is not fraudulent. Compare LaFave, Criminal Law, 
Chapter 8, § 90 (discussing fraud and other crimes falling under the rubric of false 
pretenses, which normally have the following elements: "(1) a fa^se representation of a 
material present or past fact; (2) which causes the victim; (3) to pass title to (4) his 
property to the wrongdoer, (5) who (a) knows his representation to be false and (b) 
intends thereby to defraud the victim."). 
Most false or misleading communications are made to obtain something of value 
to the person who utters them. False communications inherently involve a scheme or 
artifice, because "artifice" is not specifically defined in the Utah Code, but is commonly 
defined in broad terms such as "false or insincere behavior", "an artful stratagem" or 
"trick." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1983), at page 106. Under this 
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broad definition, an artifice always underlies any dishonest communication. 
Because criminal liability may be imposed when the object of dishonest behavior 
is "anything of value," and because intent to defraud is not an essential element, the 
applicability of the second degree felony variant of the statute applies to a virtually 
limitless array of dishonest statements or behaviors or omissions. 
For instance, newspaper columnists Marianne Jennings and Molly Ivins routinely 
and intentionally makes bold sarcastic false statements of opinion, as part of their 
schemes to obtain something of value - improvements in human behavior and national 
politics, or sales of their columns. Because the statute imposes criminal liability for 
obtaining anything of value by means of false representations, and does not require proof 
of intent to defraud, the columnists' constitutionally-protected political opinions could be 
prosecuted as second degree felony counts of communications fraud. Cf. West, supra. 
"Puffing" and political commentary are constitutionally protected forms of 
communication under both article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution and the First 
Amendment of the federal Constitution. See, e.g.. West, supra. Political candidates and 
elected government officials often make inaccurate statements or omit material facts with 
a reckless disregard for the truth, in pursuit of elections, in justifying wars, or in pursuing 
any number of other political agendas. Advertisers often communicate inaccurate 
assertions about their products with a reckless disregard for the truth, in an effort to 
achieve sales. Under the language of the communications fraud statute, the political and 
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commercial communicators are ostensibly subject to criminal liability. Compare Provo 
City v. Whatcott 2000 UT App 86, 1 P.3d 1113 (striking telephone harassment statute on 
overbreadth grounds, because statute criminalized telephone calls involving lewd or 
lascivious language, or made with the "intent to annoy, alarm another, threaten, harass, or 
frighten any person ... or recklessly creating a risk thereof"). 
A woman might lie about her weight in an effort to curry favor with her friends or 
to shield herself from embarrassment. Or a man might tell a woman that he is a Democrat 
to get a date with her, when he is in fact a Republican. In these scenarios, the offenders 
have devised a scheme or artifice to obtain something of value, have communicated for 
the purpose of executing the scheme, and ostensibly could be prosecuted as second degree 
felons. While the ordinary person would not expect such common falsehoods to result in 
second degree felony criminal liability, the plain and exceedingly broad language of the 
communications fraud statute grants prosecutors the discretion to prosecute virtually any 
dishonesty whatsoever as a second degree felony. But see. State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 
1321, 1324 (Utah 1986)(Howe, J., concurring)(,MIt would certainly be dangerous if the 
legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to 
courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at 
large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of 
the government.fff)(citation omitted). 
The Utah communications fraud statute applies to many kinds of constitutionally 
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protected speech, such as commentary on the functioning of the government,7 political 
debate,8 religious speech,9 and all manner of interpersonal communications.10 
Because second degree felony liability follows from any false communication, 
behavior, or material omission designed to garner "anything of value," the statute sweeps 
well beyond any legitimate area of governmental control, and into the realm of free 
speech and expression. Compare Provo City v. Whatcott, 2000 UT App 86, 1 P.3d 1113 
(striking telephone harassment statute on overbreadth grounds, because statute 
criminalized telephone calls involving lewd or lascivious language, or made with the 
"intent to annoy, alarm another, threaten, harass, or frighten any person ... or recklessly 
7When government leaders seek to justify a war in with false allegations of 
weapons of mass destruction, is this a second degree felony? See, e.g.. Village of 
Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (First 
Amendment protects "communication of information, the dissemination and propagation 
of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes."). 
8When a political candidate falsely promises that she will not raise taxes to garner 
votes, is this a second degree felony? See, e.g.. Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a 
Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (First Amendment protects 
"communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, 
and the advocacy of causes."). 
9When a religious leader falsely promises eternal glory to those who will do his 
bidding in a holy war, is this a second degree felony? See, e^g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 
U.S. 263, 269 (1981) (religious speech and worship protected speech under First 
Amendment). 
l0If a woman falsely pledges to love a man forever in exchange for physical 
affection, is this a second degree felony? See, e.g., Provo City v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 
458 (Utah 1989) (recognizing First Amendment protection of private speech and conduct 
between consenting adults). 
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creating a risk thereof."). 
Because there is no way to construe the communications fraud statute as 
constitutional, short of rewriting it or ignoring its plain meaning, the Court should hold 
the statute facially invalid regardless of any legitimate application it may have. See, 
Provo City v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989). A judicial attempt to rewrite the 
law would violate the separation of powers doctrine of Article V § 1 of the Utah 
Constitution, and constitute an invasion of the legislative province of lawmaking. 
See, e.g., Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263, 266 (Utah App.) (,f[S]ince it is the 
judiciary's duty to interpret the law as the legislature has enacted it, not to rewrite the law 
as it sees fit, such arguments are better saved for the legislature."), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 
1356 (Utah 1993). 
D. ERRORS IN THE NORRIS DECISIONS 
1. OVERBREADTH 
In the unpublished Norris decision, the court of appeals held that it could not 
revisit the constitutionality of the communications fraud statute because it was bound by 
State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, 97 P.3d 732, a published decision which upheld the 
constitutionality of the communications fraud statute. Unpublished Norris opinion at f 5 
andn.3. 
The published Norris decision is clearly erroneous and should be set aside, because 
in finding that the communications fraud statute is not constitutionally overbroad, Norris 
relies on New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 and n.19 (1964), for the 
proposition that malicious statements made with knowledge or reckless disregard for the 
truth are unprotected speech. The court of appeals reasoned that because the 
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communications fraud statute requires proof of a similar mens rea, it is not 
constitutionally overbroad. See published Norris decision at j^ 11. 
Sullivan is a civil libel case involving a public official. Sullivan does not stand for 
the proposition propounded by Norris - that all knowing or recklessly-made falsehoods 
are constitutionally unprotected speech, see Norris at j^ 11. Rather, Sullivan, which places 
the burden on a public official to prove knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for the 
truth in order to obtain a judgment for libel, is premised on the need for free public debate 
on public figures and their political service, and thus sets a high civil burden for public 
officials to meet in order to sue someone for libel. See id. In Sullivan, the Court 
recognized the value of falsehoods in public debate, id- at 279 and n.19, and "designed a 
constitutional privilege intended to free criticism of public officials from the restraints 
imposed by the common law of defamation," Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 
(1973). Sullivan is thus unique to its context of civil libel. 
Sullivan is inapposite to this context, which involves a criminal fraud statute which 
does not require proof of intent to defraud, but will permit a conviction based on a 
falsehood uttered with the intent to obtain anything of value, and thus applies to virtually 
all intentionally or recklessly uttered falsehoods, regardless of whether they are 
fraudulent, including political speech. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). 
In the published and unpublished Norris decisions, the court of appeals did not 
address the argument that criminal fraud statutes which impinge on First Amendment 
activities, as the communications fraud statute does, must be drawn with "narrow 
specificity" so that constitutionally-protected speech is not chilled or punished criminally 
as a byproduct of or direct application of an overbroad criminal fraud statute. See, 
Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). 
In Village of Schaumberg, the Court struck on First and Fourteenth Amendment 
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grounds an ordinance punishing organizations for soliciting charitable contributions if 
those organizations used less than 75% of the donations for anything but the charitable 
purpose advertised. The government claimed that the ordinance was valid and necessary 
to protect the public from "fraud, crime and annoyance," and the Court agreed that these 
were valid interests. See, id- at 636. However, because many legitimate charitable 
organizations might use more than 25% of their solicitations for valid purposes other than 
direct donations to their identified charitable causes, the Court found that the constitution 
would not permit the government to label such organizations as fraudulent, or to prohibit 
them from soliciting funds. Id. at 637. The Court held that the government could serve 
the interests, but would be required to do so through "narrowly drawn" regulations, 
concluding, "'Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. 
Precision of regulation must be the touchstone . . . . ' " Id. at 637, quoting NAACP v. 
Button. 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). 
Similarly and to a much greater degree, the Utah communications fraud statute 
sweeps within its ambit a huge amount of expressive conduct that does not qualify as 
fraudulent, see, e ^ , LaFave, supra, and the government's interest in preventing fraud can 
and must be met in a far narrower statute than the communications fraud statute. 
Compare Village of Schaumberg, supra. See also Secretary of State of Maryland v. 
Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 961-62, 965-68 (1984) (noting that Court in 
Schaumberg struck ordinance because there was no connection between fraud and much 
of the constitutionally protected speech to which the ordinance ostensibly applied, the 
Court struck a similar law pertaining to charitable solicitation, because there was "no core 
of easily identifiable and constitutionally prescribable conduct that the statute prohibits" 
and thus, the statute unnecessarily risked the chilling of free speech); Riley v. National 
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina. 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (striking statute similar to 
that in Schaumberg and Munson after subjecting it to strict scrutiny and concluding that it 
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was not narrowly tailored to the goals of fraud prevention and other related goals in 
charitable solicitations). 
Because the Utah communications fraud statute has "no core of easily identifiable 
and constitutionally proscribable conduct," and thus risks the chilling of free speech, and 
because the goal of fraud prevention can easily be attained by far narrower means, this 
Court should strike the communications fraud statute on overbreadth grounds. See 
Schaumberg, Munson, and Riley, supra. 
2. VAGUENESS 
The court of appeals' failure to recognize that the communications fraud statute is 
overbroad undermines the court's conclusion that the statute is not unconstitutionally 
vague, because the latter conclusion is premised on the erroneous conclusion that no 
constitutionally protected conduct is proscribed and chilled by the statute, because the 
statute requires proof of actual malice and thus comports with New York Times v. 
Sullivan, supra, Norns, 2004 UT App 267, fflj 11 and 12. 
As noted above, Sullivan is inapposite, and the communications fraud statute 
applies to all manner of constitutionally protected speech, including political debate, 
religious persuasion, and interpersonal communications. See, e.g.. Village of 
Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) (First 
Amendment protects "communication of information, the dissemination and propagation 
of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes."). 
Accordingly, the communications fraud statute should be carefully reviewed to 
assess whether it provides sufficient notice to citizens of criminally proscribed conduct, 
see. State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987) (discussing purposes of vagueness 
doctrine), and sufficient guidance to police, prosecutors, judges and juries to prevent 
subjective and discriminatory enforcement. See, e.g., Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 
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104, 108-09 (1972) (same). 
While this Court did not order briefing on vagueness in this case, in the event that 
the Court requests a supplemental brief on that point, counsel for Norris will provide the 
same. 
3. REFUSAL TO ADDRESS "ANYTHING OF VALUE" LANGUAGE 
The court of appeals ruled that Norris was charged with defrauding others of 
money, and that this case thus did not provide an opportunity to address the portion of the 
communications fraud statute pertaining to defrauding others of "anything of value." 
Unpublished Norris opinion at [^ 5 and n.3. 
In fact, all of the many informations filed against Norris alleged that his scheme 
was designed to obtain money "or anything of value." See addendum. 
Reviewing the evidence at the preliminary hearing confirms that some of Norris's 
conduct at issue may have been charged exclusively under the "anything of value" 
language, given that the goals of some of his schemes alleged at the preliminary hearing 
were to defraud people of their time and effort in working for him without his providing 
the terms of employment or compensation described in advertisements or oral 
representations.11 
uThe State's theory of its case at the preliminary hearing was unclear. In some 
instances it seemed to be that Norris was associated with a business named Laroe 
International, which hired the alleged victims under pretenses, promulgated in newspaper 
advertisements and sometimes by Norris personally, that their job descriptions were 
markedly different than the job descriptions contained in various written agreements 
which the alleged victims signed. Norris later sued the alleged victims for breaching the 
written agreements. See, e.g.. State's Exhibits 2, 3, 6, Defendant's Exhibits 2 and 3 
(examples of the agreements); R. 1866 at 8-19 (testimony of Joan Matlson). 
In other instances, however, the State's theory seemed to be that Norris failed to 
fulfill the terms of the written agreements or oral understandings regarding the alleged 
victims' terms of employment. See, e.g., R. 1866 at 146, 1867 at 182-208. 
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At the preliminary hearing, Joan Mattson testified that she saw an advertisement 
on May 20, 1993, in the Ogden Standard Examiner, and attended an interview which led 
her to believe that she could earn a salary and benefits selling a diet product for Laroe 
International, and that she was responsible for, but not the purchaser of, the diet product 
(R. 1866 at 8-11, 13-14, 32). The job in fact was not a salaried sales position, but was a 
multi-level position requiring her to recruit sales people, and the Product Installment 
Agreement she signed characterized her as an independent contractor who had purchased 
the diet product from Laroe (R. 1866 at 13-14, 19, 32). Mattson decided not to take the 
job, did not make any sales presentations and was not paid (R. 1866 at 18). She conceded 
that Norris complied with the product return agreement (R. 1866 at 45). Norris later 
sued her for $1,200 under the Product Installment Agreement (R. 1866 at 19). 
Michael Mabry answered an advertisement in the Salt Lake Tribune to be a sales 
manager for a $1,400 a month salary (R. 1866 at 94-95). He met personally with Norris 
and did not realize he was committing to being an independent contractor who had 
purchased the diet product, and later learned that Norris would not pay the advertised 
salary (R. 1866 at 100, 110). He initially testified that he worked for two weeks, but then 
testified that he did nothing after the first week because he felt the company was a fraud 
(R. 1866 at 99). Norris later sued him for approximately $1200 (R. 1866 at 100, 113). 
Kay Lemmon saw an advertisement on April 4, 1993 for a diet counselor position 
paying $1,400 salary plus benefits and met twice with Norris (R. 1866 at 115-16). She 
believed she was responsible for the product she was to distribute, but did not understand 
that she would owe Norris for the product she did not sell (R. 1866 at 126). She claimed 
she was unaware that the employment agreement required her to meet a quota of one 
hundred and twenty-nine sales presentations a month (R. 1866 at 132). She quit going to 
work after about two weeks (R. 1866 at 133). After reading the Product Installment 
Agreement, she repeatedly told Norris that she did not have any money to put down on 
the diet product, but he told her not to worry, and that they would just keep an inventory 
on it (R. 1866 at 117). She tried to return the product and he refused to take it, and later 
sued her for $1964 (R. 1866 at 119). 
Chris Atkins answered an advertisement for employment as some type of sports 
counselor in late May of 1993 (R. 1866 at 138). He came to a group meeting, had an 
individual interview, and then a training meeting when he received an inventory of the 
product (R. 1866 at 140). He signed a product installment agreement, after Norris told 
him it was a substitute for an inventory form that Norris had run out of at the time (R. 
1866 at 151). Atkins knew he would have to pay the company if he sold any diet product, 
but thought he could return the unsold bottles (R. 1866 at 153). When he demanded 
payment of his salary, Norris informed him he would be paid by commission, not salary, 
but then never paid him (R. 1866 at 146). He tried to return the product, but Norris would 
24 
Because the "anything of value" language was in fact applied in charging Norris, 
the court of appeals erred in refusing to address the constitutionality of that language. 
II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT OBTAIN JURISDICTION 
OVER THE CASE WHICH WAS FILED WHEN BETWEEN 
THE PREMATURE ISSUANCE AND RECALL OF THE REMITTITUR. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-4 (2003) provides, "No person shall be punished for a 
public offense until convicted in a court having jurisdiction." 
As is detailed in the Statement of the Case, supra, the information in the instant 
case was filed after the remittitur issued prematurely and before it was recalled, and thus 
before the remittitur properly issued from the appeal stemming from the original 
misdemeanor case prosecuted by West Valley City in the name of the State. 
not take it, and later sued him for about $2,000 (R. 1866 at 142). 
Susan Hunter saw an ad in a Utah County journal for work with nutritional 
supplements, paying between $800 and $1,200, depending on the number of hours 
worked (R. 1866 at 158-59, 166). She went to a group meeting, and was hired to service 
established accounts (R. 1866 at 160-61). She attended training meetings for two weeks, 
but after leaving to attend to her family, was never able to contact Norris to begin 
working (R. 1866 at 161-62). She signed a sheet regarding the product, but thought it 
was just for inventory, and did not understand that she was supposed to sell the product 
(R. 1866 at 163). Norris later sued her for around $2,700 (R. 1866 at 164). 
Joy Slotsve answered an advertisement in the Salt Lake Tribune in May of 1993 
advertising a diet consultant position paying a salary of $1400 a month (R. 1867 at 182). 
She met personally with Norris, and someone called her back and she was hired (R. 1867 
at 184-85). She believed she would be paid the salary to sell the product (R. 1867 at 185). 
She made sales presentations, but was never paid (R. 1867 at 186). She was required to 
buy the product as part of her job, and when she tried to return it within the fifteen days 
under the contract, Norris refused it (R. 1867 at 186-87). She believed she could return 
unopened individual containers, but he would not accept open boxes of sealed individual 
containers (R. 1867 at 196). She gave him a check for the portion of the product that was 
used, but he refused to cash it and sued her for the full amount (R. 1867 at 188). He sued 
her for $2,700, and then sued her for $30,000 for "turning people against him." (R. 1867 
at 189, 207-08). 
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Before the court of appeals, Norris argued that under Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Foothills Water Company, 942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996) (per 
curiam), infra, the trial court failed to obtain subject matter jurisdiction over this last case 
filed, because the information which was filed before the remittitur issued properly was 
void and a nullity. 
The court of appeals rejected this claim on the theory that under Chase Manhattan 
Bank v. Principal Funding Corp., 2004 UT 9, 89 P.3d 109, the court of appeals' dismissal 
of the West Valley case was self-executing and thus provided jurisdiction for the refiling 
of the charges against Norris, regardless of the recalling of the remittitur. Unpublished 
Norris opinion at ^ 8 and 9. 
By reviewing Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Foothills Water Company, 
942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996) (per curiam), this Court can confirm that the trial court failed 
to obtain subject matter jurisdiction over this last case filed, because the information 
which was filed before the remittitur issued properly was void and a nullity. 
In Hi-Country, a trial court modified its judgment in accordance with an appellate 
decision from the court of appeals, before this Court disposed of a petition for a writ of 
certiorari. See id., at 305-06. The Court addressed several related jurisdictional issues, 
beginning with the premise that a trial court does not have jurisdiction over a case which 
is pending on appeal. Id. at 306. The Court noted that the court of appeals issuance of 
the remittitur before the certiorari petition was filed did not vest jurisdiction in the trial 
court, because the remittitur was premature and should not have issued until the 
expiration of time for filing a petition for certiorari. Id. The Court explained that if 
proceedings may occur simultaneously in different courts in one case, this disserves 
judicial economy and renders the case a "proverbial 'moving target.'" Id. at 307. 
The Court concluded by vacating the modified judgment of the trial court, finding 
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that it was entered when the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and was void. 
Id. 
In the instant matter, West Valley City, acting in the name of the State of Utah, 
originally prosecuted this case as misdemeanors, and then appealed when Circuit Judge 
Watson dismissed it because he interpreted the communications fraud statute as requiring 
felony charges in this case, which at that time, belonged in district, not circuit court. 
Despite the ongoing proceedings in the court of appeals, then this Court, and then 
the United States Supreme Court in this very case, the State repeatedly refiled the charges 
before the remittitur properly issued, and before the lower courts could properly obtain 
subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Norris. See Hi-Country, supra. 
Because the district courts had no jurisdiction when the case was before the 
appellate courts, see, High-Country, the informations filed in those courts are null and 
void. See, e ^ , Transworld Systems Inc. v. Robison, 796 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah 1990) 
(proceedings conducted without jurisdiction are nullities and void). 
The court of appeals misread Chase Manhattan Bank v. Principal Funding Corp., 
2004 UT 9, 89 P.3d 109, and consequently harbored the incorrect belief that the court of 
appeals' dismissal of the West Valley case was self-executing and thus provided 
jurisdiction for the refiling of the charges against Norris, regardless of the recalling of the 
remittitur. Unpublished Norris opinion at ^ 8 and 9. 
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As Chase Manhattan itself recognizes, a district court has no jurisdiction until the 
remittitur issues properly. See id. at ffi[ 7 and 12 (equating trial court's receipt of 
remittitur with "revesting of jurisdiction"); and at f 9 ("Remittitur is not an order of the 
appellate court, but merely gives the trial court such jurisdiction as it needs to implement 
the appellate court's decision in the matter. Remittitur is a formal revesting of jurisdiction 
with the trial court after appellate proceedings[.]") (citation omitted). 
As Hi-Country demonstrates, when a remittitur issues prematurely, all actions of a 
trial court are nullities. See id-
The court of appeals did not address Norris' argument that the refiling before 
multiple district court judges violated the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine. 
At the time that 971008355 was filed, the West Valley case was on appeal, and 
case number 971005698 was set for a hearing before Judge Dever on a pending motion 
to dismiss with prejudice (R. 1861 at 7-8, 16). The filing of the successive prosecutions 
violated the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine, which prevents co-equal courts from acting 
simultaneously in one case. This doctrine has governed in this state for years. As the 
Court explained in Escalante Co. v. Kent, 7 P.2d 276 (Utah 1932), 
"Where two actions between the same parties, on the same subject, and to 
test the same rights, are brought in different courts having concurrent 
jurisdiction, the court which first acquires jurisdiction, its power being 
adequate to the administration of complete justice, retains its jurisdiction 
and may dispose of the whole controversy, and no court of coordinate 
power is at liberty to interfere with its action. This rule rests upon comity 
and the necessity of avoiding conflict in the execution of judgments by 
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independent courts, and is a necessary one because any other rule would 
unavoidably lead to perpetual collision and be productive of most 
calamitous results." 
Id. at 278 (citation omitted). 
The convoluted procedural history of this case, and Mr. Norris' experiences in 
having been repeatedly charged, arrested and hailed before so many different courts to 
answer so many different charges and theories premised on the same underlying facts, 
prove the validity of, and the importance of complying with, the concurrent jurisdiction 
doctrine. See M. See, also, $&, Nielson v. Schiller, 66 P.2d 365, 366 (Utah 1937) 
(refiling elements of case in one court while other elements are pending in another court 
of concurrent jurisdiction "is abhorrent to the orderly procedure and determination of 
causes in courts of concurrent jurisdiction and cannot do other than inject confusion into 
the orderly procedure of the courts."). 
Because the district court never had proper jurisdiction over Mr. Norris, this Court 
should order his case dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the court of appeals' decision, and hold that the 
communications fraud statute is constitutionally overbroad and that the district court 
failed to obtain jurisdiction over this case, which was filed between the premature 
issuance and recall of the remittitur. 
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Respectfully submitted on June 2, 2005. 
Eliiabelh Hur 
i 
Attorney for Mr. Norris 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing to Assistant 
Attorney General Kris Leonard, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114-0854, on June 2, 2005. 
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STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 1 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and 
liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of 
their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress 
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for 
the abuse of that right. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 15 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press. In all 
criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it 
shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with 
good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have 
the right to determine the law and the fact. 
Constitution of Utah, Article V § 1 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed 
or permitted. 
Constitution of Utah, Article VI § 1 
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in: 
(a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the Legislature of 
the State of Utah; and 
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2). 
(2) (a) (i) The legal voters of the State of Utah in the numbers, under the conditions, in 
the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may: 
(A) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people for adoption 
upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as provided by statute; or 
(B) require any law passed by the Legislature, except those laws passed by a two-thirds 
vote of the members elected to each house of the Legislature, to be submitted to the 
voters of the State, as provided by statute, before the law may take effect. 
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a)(i)(A), legislation initiated to allow, limit, or 
prohibit the taking of wildlife or the season for or method of taking wildlife shall be 
adopted upon approval of two-thirds of those voting. 
(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or town, in the numbers, under the conditions, in 
the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may: 
(i) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people of the county, 
city, or town for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as 
provided by statute; or 
(ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of the county, city, or 
town to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided by statute, before the law or 
ordinance may take effect. 
United States Constitution, Amendment I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1990) 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain 
from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates 
directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or 
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is $100 or less; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is more than $100 but -does not exceed $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is more than $1,000 but does not exceed $10,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is more than $10,000 but does not exceed $100,000; 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud is other 
than the obtaining of something of monetary value; and 
(f) a first degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is $100,000 or more. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be 
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be 
obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as provided in 
Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense described 
in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (1) to 
permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary 
element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a 
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of 
communication fraud. 
(6)(a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, make 
known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit information, 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, telephone, 
telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted 
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1995) 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain 
from another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates 
directly or indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or 
concealing the scheme or artifice is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is less than $300; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000; 
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or 
sought to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud is other 
than the obtaining of something of monetary value. 
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be 
measured by the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be 
obtained by the scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as provided in 
Subsection (l)(e). 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense described 
in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (1) to 
permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessary 
element of the offense. 
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a 
scheme or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of 
communication fraud. 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, make 
known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit information, 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, telephone, 
telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted 
intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-4 (2003) 
No person shall be punished for a public offense until convicted in a court having 
jurisdiction. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official Publication) 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
[1] Defendant Richard F. Norris appeals his conviction of attempted communications 
fraud. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4401 to 76404801 (1997). We affirm. 
In December 1994, West Valley City (West Valley) charged Defendant with four 
misdemeanor counts of communications fraud in the Third Circuit Court, West Valley 
Department. JFNll See Utah Code Ann, § 76-10-1801(1) (1994). In February 1996, the 
circuit court dismissed the misdemeanor charges, ruling that the aggregate of the four 
misdemeanor counts exceeded the circuit court's jurisdictional limit of $1000.00. West 
Valley appealed the circuit court's decision. 
FN1. Circuit courts merged into district courts on July 1,1996. See Utah Code 
Ann, § 784-2 (1997). 
[2] On December 10,1996, because the State was prepared to file felony counts of 
communications fraud against Defendant in district court, West Valley moved this court 
to dismiss its appeal. On March 26, 1997, this court dismissed the appeal, and on May 13, 
1997, this court issued a remittitur. Two days later, the State filed twenty felony charges 
of communications fraud against Defendant in district court. 
[3] Defendant moved to recall the remittitur on the ground that it had been issued 
prematurely because Defendant's time to file a petition for certiorari had not expired. On 
June 26, 1997, the Utah Supreme Court ordered this court to recall the remittitur, which 
this court did on June 30, 1997. On September 26, 1997, Defendant moved the district 
court to dismiss the felony charges because the West Valley case was still active. The 
district court did not dismiss the charges, but rather stayed its proceedings until all 
activity in the West Valley appeal had ceased. 
[4] After Defendant's petitions for certiorari had been denied in both the Utah Supreme 
Court and the United States Supreme Court, this court reissued the remittitur on October 
30, 1998. Defendant then moved the district court to dismiss the felony charges, claiming 
that (i) the communications fraud statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and 
(ii) the district court lacked jurisdiction over the May 1997 felony charges because the 
May 1997 remittitur was subsequently recalled. The district court denied the motions. 
Defendant then entered a conditional plea in which Defendant preserved his right to 
challenge the constitutionality of the communications fraud statute and the jurisdiction of 
the district court to hear the felony charges filed in May 1997. Defendant appeals these 
two issues. [FN21 
FN2, Defendant attempts to raise numerous other issues in his briefs. We do not 
address these issues because they exceed the scope of what was preserved in the 
conditional plea. Defendant mentions plain error in a single paragraph, but fails to 
apply plain error doctrine to any of the specific issues raised. Thus, we do not 
address Defendant's plain error argument because it is inadequately briefed. See 
Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(5)(B) ("The brief of the appellant shall contain ... a 
statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial 
court."). 
[5] Defendant argues that the statute under which he was charged is unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad. However, after this appeal was filed, this court addressed these 
specific challenges. See State v. Morris. 2004 UT App 267,ff 8-16, 97 P3d 732 (holding 
that the communications fraud statute is neither unconstitutionally overbroad nor 
unconstitutionally vague). Thus, Defendant's constitutional challenges to the 
communications fraud statute fail. [FN3] 
FN3, Defendant claims that our prior decision did not directly deal with the phrase 
"anything of value," and thus we are free to hold that the statute is 
unconstitutionally vague on that basis. However, our prior decision did hold that 
"because Defendant was charged with devising a scheme to defraud others of 
money, his actions do not fall within the anything of value realm, and thus, he may 
not challenge this phrase as unconstitutionally vague." State y. Nam's. 2004 UT 
App 267,f 15, 97 P.3d 732 (quotations and citations omitted). In this case, 
Defendant also was charged with devising a scheme to defraud others of money, 
and thus under the rule articulated in Norris, Defendant also may not challenge this 
phrase as unconstitutionally vague in this case. See id. 
In addition, Defendant's challenge to the State charging multiple counts when one 
communication reaches numerous victims already has been decided by this court. 
See State v. Bradshaw. 2004 UT App 298, 99 P J d 359. 
[6] Defendant also challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear the felony charges 
filed in May 1997. Specifically, Defendant argues that even though this court had issued a 
remittitur in the West Valley appeal before the felony charges were filed, the remittitur 
had no effect because it was subsequently recalled. We disagree. 
[7] "The determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of 
law, which we review for correctness, according no deference to the district court's 
determination." Beaver County v. Qwest Inc.* 2001 UT 81,f 8, 31 P J d 1147. The issue 
in this case is whether a valid order dismissing the misdemeanor charges in the West 
Valley case existed at the time felony charges were filed. The parties focus their 
arguments on Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass fn. v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 
305 (Utah 1996), which held that actions taken by a trial court after a remittitur issues are 
void if the remittitur is subsequently recalled. See id. at 307. Hi-Country, however, does 
not control the outcome of this case. 
[8] The controlling case is Chase Manhattan Bank v. Principal Funding Corp., 2004 
UT 9,89 P J d 109. [FN4] In Chase Manhattan, the court outlined the situations in which 
judgments by appellate courts are self-executing. See id. at f^ 11. The court concluded 
that, under the 1997 version of rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
where "the trial court need not act for a valid order to be found in the record," the 
judgment is self-executing unless a party specifically requests and is granted a stay of the 
remittitur before it issues. [FN5] Id. at f 12. Specifically, the court held that if a judgment 
by this court is self-executing, then a valid order exists on the record from the moment the 
remittitur is issued until it is subsequently recalled. See id. at Tf 7. 
FN4 The State cites Nielson v. Schiller, 92 Utah 137, 66 P.2d 365 (1937), a civil 
case, for the proposition that a second-filed action should be stayed until the first-
filed action has been resolved. See id. at 368, Because that case did not involve a 
remittitur, or even an appeal, it does not speak directly to the jurisdictional issue in 
this case. Rather, it merely indicates that in this case it was proper for the district 
court to issue a stay once it was aware that the appeal had been resuscitated. 
FN5, The current rule avoids the odd situation in this case by providing that a 
remittitur issues immediately after the time for filing a petition for certiorari has 
expired, unless such a petition is filed, in which case the remittitur is automatically 
stayed. See Utah R.App. P. 36(a)(2). 
[9] In the West Valley appeal, acting on a motion by the appellant, this court dismissed 
the appeal. Dismissal of the West Valley appeal required no further action by the circuit 
court, but rather left in place the circuit court's ruling that dismissed the misdemeanor 
charges without prejudice. Thus, when the State filed felony charges in district court two 
days after this court issued a remittitur, no further action was required in the West Valley 
case. Therefore, a valid judgment existed on the record when felony charges were filed. 
The subsequent recall of the remittitur on Defendant's motion did not change this fact. See 
id. at ^ 12-13. For this reason, the district court did not lack jurisdiction when charges 
were filed in this case. [FN6] Therefore, we affirm. 
FN6» Defendant claims that his due process rights were violated when 
the State vindictively prosecuted the felony case against him, and thus under 
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), the due process violations strip the 
district court of jurisdiction. However, unlike in Blackledge, the record in this case 
does not indicate a "realistic likelihood of Vindictiveness,1" id. at 27, because (i) 
the original trial court dismissed the misdemeanor charges sua sponte, (ii) the 
appeal was taken by West Valley, not the Defendant, (iii) the State indicated its 
intention to file felony charges prior to Defendant asking the Utah Supreme Court 
to recall the appeal, and (iv) the State had a legitimate reason to file felony charges 
when it did, namely concern over the statute of limitations. While the State's 
actions in this case were less than ideal, the record does not come close to 
establishing prosecutorial vindictiveness in response to Defendant exercising his 
procedural rights on appeal. 
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge and NORMAN i i 
JACKSON, Judge. 
UtahApp.,2004. 
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OPINION 
DAVIS, Judge: 
**1 After entering an unconditional, voluntary guilty 
plea to three counts of communications fraud, Richard 
Norris (Defendant) challenges the constitutionality of 
the underlying statute (the communications fraud 
statute) on appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 
(2003). TFNU We affirm. 
FN1. Because the communications fraud 
statute has not changed since Defendant was 
charged, we cite to the most current version 
for convenience. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 Defendant was charged with seven counts of 
communications fraud and was bound over on all 
counts. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2003). 
After several days of trial, Defendant entered an 
unconditional, voluntary guilty plea to three counts of 
third-degree-felony communications fraud. See id. § 
76-10-1801(l)(c). After sentencing, and without 
moving to withdraw his guilty pleas, Defendant filed a 
timely notice of appeal, mounting a facial challenge to 
the constitutionality of the communications fraud statute 
on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[11[21F31 **3 We consider two issues on appeal. First, 
we must determine whether this court has subject matter 
jurisdiction to consider Defendant's constitutional 
challenge after Defendant entered an unconditional, 
voluntary guilty plea. "The determination of whether a 
court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of 
law, which we review for correctness...." Beaver 
County v. Qwest Inc.. 2001 UT 81,11 8, 31 P.3d 1147. 
Second, if this court has jurisdiction, then we must 
consider whether the communications fraud statute is 
unconstitutionally overbroad or vague on its face. 
"Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions 
of law, which we review for correctness." Provo City 
Corp. v. Thompson, 2004 UT 14,11 5, 86 P.3d 735. 
"When addressing such a challenge, this court presumes 
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that the statute is valid, and we resolve any reasonable 
doubts in favor of constitutionality." State v. Lopes, 
1999 UT 24,116, 980 P.2d 191. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
[41T51 **4 "The general rule applicable in criminal 
proceedings ... is that by pleading guilty, the defendant 
is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements 
of the *736 crime charged and thereby waives all 
nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea 
constitutional violations." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 
1275.1278 (Utah 1989); see also State v. Hardy, 2002 
UT App 244,11 13, 54 P.3d 645. The State asserts that 
Defendant's facial challenge to the constitutionality of 
the communications fraud statute falls within the ambit 
of the "pre-plea constitutional violations" mentioned in 
Parsons. 781 P.2dat 1278. Therefore, the State argues 
that because Defendant's challenge is nonjurisdictional 
in nature, it was waived by his guilty plea. Defendant 
asserts that "pre-plea constitutional violations," id^ 
encompass violations involving such things as Miranda 
admonitions and search warrants, and that a facial 
constitutional challenge to a statute is, at its heart, a 
jurisdictional issue. Therefore, Defendant argues that 
his challenge was not waived by his guilty plea. 
r6ir71[81 **5 "Subject matter jurisdiction is the power 
and authority of the court to determine a controversy 
and without which it cannot proceed." Thompson v. 
Jackson, 743P.2d 1230,1232 (UtahCt.App. 1987)(per 
curiam). Subject matter jurisdiction "can neither be 
waived nor conferred by consent of the accused. 
Objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the 
subject matter may be urged at any stage of the 
proceedings, and the right to make such an objection is 
never waived." James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 
(Utah Ct.App. 1998) (quotations and citations omitted). 
When subject matter jurisdiction is an issue, "[i]t is the 
duty of this court to 'satisfy itself not only of its own 
jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause 
under review.'" EEOCv. Chicago Club, 86F.3d 1423, 
1428 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 
U.S. 237, 244, 55 S.Ct. 162, 79 L.Ed. 338 (1934)). 
TFN21 
FN2. Instead of focusing on whether subject 
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matter jurisdiction exists in a particular 
context, Judge Bench relies on Utah cases 
generally describing jurisdiction of our courts 
of general jurisdiction. The issue squarely 
presented in this case has not been addressed 
by Utah courts. 
Our jurisprudence, however, is no stranger to 
the concept that a court with general 
jurisdiction over a particular claim may or 
may not have subject matter jurisdiction over 
that claim. Although not directly analogous to 
the case at bar, perhaps the best example 
involves claims against governmental entities. 
There is no question that courts of general 
jurisdiction in Utah have jurisdiction over 
those claims. This notwithstanding, however, 
Utah appellate decisions have repeatedly held 
that the failure to strictly comply with the 
statutory requirements for claims against 
governmental entities deprives those courts of 
subject matter jurisdiction over such claims. 
See, e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit Auth, 2001 
UT 109,111116-17,37 P.3d 1156; SecurityInv. 
Ltd. v. Brown, 2002 UT App 131,11 13, 47 
P.3d97. 
f9iri01 **6 "In general, a plea of guilty waives all 
nonjurisdictional defects, but does not bar appeal of 
claims that the applicable statute is unconstitutional or 
that the indictment fails to state an offense." United 
States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262 n. 1 (9th 
Cir.1979). "Although a guilty plea waives all non[ 
]jurisdictional defects and fact issues, a vagueness 
challenge is a jurisdictional defect. Thus, following a 
guilty plea, a defendant could raise on appeal that he 
was prosecuted under an unconstitutional statute." 
United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314, 1317 (6th 
Cir.1994) (quotations and citation omitted); see Menna 
v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241, 46 
L.Ed.2d 195 (1975) (per curiam) ("We simply hold that 
a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that-
judged on its face--the charge is one which the State 
may not constitutionally prosecute."); Blackledze v. 
Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 
628 (1974) (holding that guilty plea did not preclude 
the defendant from raising his constitutional claims 
because they "went to the very power of the State to 
bring the defendant into court to answer the charge 
brought against him"); United States v. Whited, 311 
F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir.2002) (addressing defendant's 
claim that the underlying statute was unconstitutional 
because it "properly f[e]ll within the narrow scope of 
review not barred by a guilty plea"), cert, denied, 538 
U.S. 1065, 123 S.Ct. 2234, 155 L.Ed.2d 1121 (2003); 
United States y. Morgan, 230 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th 
Cir.2000) (recognizing that a claim that a statute is 
facially unconstitutional is a jurisdictional claim not 
waived by a guilty plea); United States v. McKenzie, 99 
F.3d813, 816 (7th Cir. 1996) (addressing defendant's 
argument on appeal after his guilty plea because he 
made "the only argument *737 available to him by 
asserting a jurisdictional challenge based on the 
constitutionality of the underlying statute"); United 
States y. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884, 885 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1996) 
("[The defendant] entered his guilty plea without 
preserving his constitutional challenge[ to the 
underlying statute] for appeal. However, the 
government has expressly declined to raise a waiver 
argument, citing United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495, 
496-97 (7th Cir. 1995) (challenge to constitutionality of 
statute of conviction is, in certain circumstances, 
jurisdictional claim not waived by guilty plea)."); Bell, 
70 F.3d at 496-97 (addressing defendant's challenge to 
the constitutionality of the underlying statute after 
recognizing the principle that such a challenge "is a 
jurisdictional claim which is not waived by the guilty 
plea"); United States v. Palacios-Casquete, 55 F.3d 
557, 561 (UthCir.1995) ("A guilty plea ... does not 
waive the right of an accused to challenge the 
constitutionality of the statute under which he is 
convicted."); Marzano v. Kincheloe, 915 F.2d 549,552 
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant "did not 
waive his constitutional attack on the [underlying] 
statute by pleading guilty"); United States v. Mont ilia, 
870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that although 
the dividing line between constitutional claims that are 
waived by a guilty plea and those that survive the plea 
is not "crystal-clear," "[c]laims that 'the applicable 
statute is unconstitutional or that the indictment fails to 
state an offense' are jurisdictional claims not waived by 
the guilty plea" (quoting Broncheau, 597 F.2d at 1262 
n. 1)), amended by 907 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Bar boa, 111 F.2d 1420, 1423 n. 3 
(10th Cir. 1985) ("A plea of guilty ... does not bar a 
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claim that the defendant may not constitutionally be 
convicted m the first instance If [the defendant] 
ple[aded] guilty to something which was not a crime, he 
is not now precluded from raising this jurisdictional 
defect, which goes 'to the very power of the State to 
bring the defendant into court to answer the charge 
brought against him'" (quoting Blackledze, 417 US 
at 30, 94 S Ct 2098)), United States v Hill, 564 F 2d 
1179, 1180 (5th Cir 1977) (per curiam) (recognizing 
that "a guilty plea does not bar an appeal that asserts 
that the charge is unconstitutional"), United States v 
Tallant, 547 F2d 1291, 1295 n 5 (5th Cir 1977) 
(recognizing that a claim based upon "the 
unconstitutionality of the statute underlying the 
indictment" was an "appealable issue[ ] following a 
guilty plea"), United States v Winter, 509 F 2d 975, 
978 n 8 (5th Cir 1975) (recognizing "that after entering 
a plea of guilty, a defendant may only appeal 
jurisdictional defects in the proceeding below, such as 
the unconstitutionality of the statute underlying the 
indictment"), Mercado v Rockefeller, 502 F 2d 666, 
672 (2d Cir 1974) ("[I]t is clear that [a] guilty plea 
waives only nonjunsdictional defects and does not 
waive the right to contest the constitutionality of the 
statute that is the basis for a conviction" (second 
alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted)), 
United States v Cox, 464 F 2d 937, 941 (6th Cir 1972) 
(recognizing that "[a] defendant who has pleaded guilty 
is not barred from claiming that the statute under 
which he was charged is unconstitutional" (quotations 
and citation omitted)), 1A Charles Alan Wright, 
Federal Practice and Procedure Criminal § 175 (3d ed 
1999) ("[T]he preclusive effects of guilty pleas do not 
apply to constitutional claims that go 'to the very power 
of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer 
the charge brought against him ' A defendant who has 
pleaded guilty may still contend that the statute under 
which he was charged is unconstitutional" (quoting 
Blackled^e, 417 U S at 30, 94 S Ct 2098) (footnotes 
omitted)) 
*
w7 Because a facial challenge to the constitutionality 
of a statute directly cuts to "the power and authority of 
the court to determine a controversy," Thompson, 743 
P2d at 1232, it is necessarily a jurisdictional matter 
Accordingly, an unconditional guilty plea does not 
operate as a waiver of a facial constitutional challenge 
to a statute, because such a challenge is jurisdictional in 
nature [FN31 *738 Therefore, we address Defendant's 
arguments TFN41 
FN3 The justice court appeal process analog 
in Judge Bench's opinion is somewhat 
puzzling 
Since justice courls are not courts of record, 
traditional appellate review is generally 
unavailable or >everely limited This 
notwithstanding, the Utah Constitution 
guarantees "the right to appeal in all[ criminal] 
cases" Utah Const art 1, § 12 In City of 
Monticello v Chrutensen, 788 P 2d 513 (Utah 
1990), our supreme court ruled that the trial de 
novo appellate procedure now set out m Utah 
Code Annotated section 78-5-120 (2002) 
satisfied this constitutional mandate See 
Christensen, 788 P 2d at 518-19 Following a 
trial de novo, traditional appeal therefrom is 
available only if "the district court rules on the 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance " 
Utah Code Ann § 78-5- 120(7) 
In our view, this unique process for obtaining 
review of justice court proceedings has 
nothing to do v/ith issue preservation or 
waiver of nonjunsdictional constitutional 
claims by voluntary guilty plea- section 
78-5-120 makes no reference to either 
Indeed, if anything, it is a recognition of the 
importance of claims involving the 
constitutionality of statutes or ordinances, 
specifically contemplating such challenges in 
the court of record in the first appeal Under 
the statutory scheme, raising the constitutional 
challenge to the statute or ordinance is the 
method by which jurisdiction is conferred on 
appellate courts lo entertain further appeals, 
the defendant having already been accorded 
his or her constitutional right of appeal from 
the justice court by trial de novo in a court of 
record This is a far cry from the ability to 
challenge subject matter jurisdiction in an 
initial appeal of right 
FN4 The State argues that Myers v State, 
2004UT31,94P3d211, both addresses and 
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disposes of the issues herein. The appellant's 
claims in Myers were based upon the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act, see id atf 10; 
and, to the extent the appellant alluded to 
constitutional defects in a statute, his 
challenge was not facial. Accordingly, the 
Utah Supreme Court characterized his 
argument as based on an "allegedly incorrect 
legal interpretation [of a rule of law]," and 
never addressed or ruled upon the effect of a 
facial constitutional challenge. Id at j^ 17. 
II. Constitutional Challenge 
**8 Defendant argues that the communications fraud 
statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (2003). We consider 
each of his arguments in turn. 
A. Overbreadth 
nnri21fl31 **9 "In considering whether a statute [is 
overbroad], a court's first task is to determine whether 
the enactment reaches a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct." In re IM L , 2002 
UT 110,11 15,61 P.3d 1038 (quotations and citations 
omitted). We examine "criminal statutes ... with 
particular care; those that make unlawful a substantial 
amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be 
held facially invalid even if they also have legitimate 
application." Id_ (quotations and citations omitted). 
However, "[o]nly a statute that is substantially 
overbroad may be invalidated on its face." City of 
Houston v Hill, 482 U S 451,458, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 
LEd.2d 398 (1987). Overbreadth "must not only be 
real, but substantial as well " Ashcroft v ACLU, 535 
U.S. 564,584,122 S.Ct. 1700,152L.Ed.2d771 (2002) 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
ri41[151fl61 **10 When interpreting the challenged 
language, "we look to the statute's plain language and 
presume that the legislature used each term advisedly." 
In re I ML, 2002 UT 110 at If 16, 61 P.3d 1038. 
"Statutory language is overbroad if its language 
proscribes both harmful and innocuous behavior." Salt 
Lake City v Lopez, 935 P 2d 1259, 1263 (Utah 
Ct.App.1997) (quotations and citations omitted). The 
communications fraud statute prohibits 
devis[ing] any scheme or artifice to defraud another 
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or to obtain from another money, property, or 
anything of value by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, promises, or material 
omissions, and ... communicat [ing] directly or 
indirectly with any person by any means for the 
purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or 
artifice. 
Utah Code Ann §76-10-1801(1). Defendant posits 
that the communications fraud statute is overbroad 
"because it permits criminal prosecution and sanctions 
in every case involving a communicationf ] that could 
be construed as dishonest." Specifically, Defendant 
argues that the communications fraud statute does not 
require an intent to defraud, and that it criminalizes 
innocuous behavior because "[a]s long as there is an 
artifice, a false communication in any form made for the 
purpose of executing the artifice, and a desire to obtain 
anything of value, the elements of the communications 
fraud statute are met." Defendant also alleges that the 
modes of communications prohibited *739 in the 
communications fraud statute are similarly overbroad 
and prohibit constitutionally protected conduct. See id. 
§76-10-1801(6). We disagree. 
[17] * * 11 First, the communications fraud statute does 
not prohibit all false "pretenses, representations, 
promises, or material omissions," only those where an 
individual seeks "to defraud another or to obtain from 
another money, property, or anything of value." Id § 
76-10-1801(1). Second, it requires proof that the false 
or fraudulent "pretenses, representations, promises, or 
material omissions made or omitted were made or 
omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth." Id §76-10-1801(7). While the 
First Amendment may value some falsehoods for their 
contribution to public debate, see New York Times Co 
v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n. 19, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 
LEd.2d 686 (1964), it has not given protection to 
malicious statements that were made "with knowledge 
that [they were] false or with reckless disregard of 
whether [they were] false or not." Id at 279-80, 84 
S Ct. 710. The communications fraud statute draws the 
distinction between criminal and innocent behavior with 
a similar mens rea, and thus, it cannot be said that it is 
"substantially overbroad" and should be "invalidated on 
its face." Hill, 482 U.S. at 458, 107 S.Ct 2502. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the communications 
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fraud statute is not overbroad on its face. 
B. Vagueness 
[18iri91 **12 Defendant argues that the 
communications fraud statute is unconstitutionally 
vague in its use of the terms "artifice," "communicate," 
and "anything of value." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-1801(1). (6)(a). "The void-for-vagueness 
doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance define an 
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people 
can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a 
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement." Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265 
(quotations and citations omitted). However, because 
the communications fraud statute "implicates no 
constitutionally protected conduct," Defendant must 
show that it "is impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc , 455 U.S. 489,494-95, 102 S.Ct. 
1186,71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982), 
f20H2Ur221 **13 Defendant argues that the term 
"artifice," Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1), is defined 
too broadly and would encompass any form of deceit so 
that ordinary persons would not know whether the 
deceit was prohibited. While not defined in the 
communications fraud statute, "artifice" is commonly 
understood to mean "an artful stratagem," or a "trick." 
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 106 (9th 
ed.1986). Black's Law Dictionary defines "artifice" 
similarly as "[a] clever plan or idea, especially] one 
intended to deceive." Black's Law Dictionary 108 (7th 
ed.1999). Additionally, we do not read the term 
"artifice," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), in a 
vacuum, but rather as it relates to the other terms within 
the communications fraud statute. See Dowling v. 
Bullen, 2004 UT 50,^ 8, 94 P.3d 915 (stating that 
"[sjubsections of a statute should not be construed in a 
vacuum but must be read as part of the statute as a 
whole" (alteration in original) (quotations and citation 
omitted)). Contrary to Defendant's assertions, the 
communications fraud statute does not prohibit all artful 
stratagems and tricks, only those meant to, inter alia, 
defraud others. While the term "artifice," Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), may be construed broadly, "a 
statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it is 
broad." State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 
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1989). We conclude that the term "artifice," Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1801(1), is used with "sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what 
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not 
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." 
Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265 (quotations and citations 
omitted). Therefore, we conclude that the term 
"artifice," as used in the co>mmunications fraud statute, 
is not unconstitutionally vague. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-1801(1). 
[231 **14 Defendant next argues that the term 
"communicate," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(6)(a), 
is vague because it is "given the broadest possible 
definition" under the *740 communications fraud 
statute. The communications fraud statute prohibits 
"communicating] directly or indirectly with any person 
by any means for the purpose of executing or 
concealing the scheme or artifice." Id § 
76-10-1801(1). Additionally, it specifically states that 
to communicate "means to bestow, convey, make 
known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; 
to talk over; or to transmit information." Id. § 
76-10-1801(6)(a). Defendant's argument is unavailing. 
Although "communicate," Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-1801(6)(a), is broadly defined, this does not 
necessarily make the term unconstitutionally vague. See 
Wareham, 772P.2dat966. Indeed, the communications 
fraud statute does not seek to punish those who keep an 
artifice or scheme to themselves. Defendant fails to 
demonstrate how "ordinary people canfnot] understand 
what conduct is prohibited," Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1265 
(quotations and citations omitted), and therefore, fails 
to demonstrate that the term "communicate," as used in 
the communications fraud statute, is unconstitutionally 
vague. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(6)(a). 
f24ir251 **15 Finally, Defendant argues that the 
phrase "anything of value," Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-1801(1), is unconstitutionally vague because it is 
undefined and left open to a variety of interpretations. 
Defendant proffers numerous hypothetical situations in 
an attempt to illustrate the vagueness of the phrase 
"anything of value." Id. However, "speculation about 
possible vagueness in hypothetical situations not before 
the [c]ourt will not support a facial attack on a statute 
when it is surely valid in the vast majority of its 
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intended applications." Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 
733, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000) 
(quotations and citation omitted). Defendant was 
charged under the communications fraud statute 
because he devised a scheme to defraud others of 
"money." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). We 
believe that "the vast majority of [the communications 
fraud statute's] intended applications," Colorado, 530 
U.S. at 733, 120 S.Ct. 2480 (quotations and citations 
omitted), will involve incidents where individuals have 
defrauded others of "money" or "property," Utah Code 
Ann. §76-10-1801(1), both of which are terms that are 
sufficiently understood to allow ordinary citizens to 
determine what conduct is prohibited. See Lopez, 935 
P.2d at 1265. Additionally, because Defendant was 
charged with devising a scheme to defraud others of 
"money," Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801(1), his actions 
do not fall within the "anything of value" realm, id^ and 
thus, he may not challenge this phrase as 
unconstitutionally vague. See Village of Hoffman 
Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n. 7, 102 S.Ct. 1186 ("One to 
whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not 
successfully challenge it for vagueness." (quotations 
and citation omitted)). [FN51 
FN5. In his brief on appeal, Defendant states 
that "[a]rguably, this is precisely the type of 
conduct the communications fraud statute was 
intended to prohibit." 
**16 Defendant's constitutional challenge to the 
communications fraud statute fails. We conclude that 
the communications fraud statute is neither 
unconstitutionally overbroad, nor unconstitutionally 
vague. 
CONCLUSION 
**17 A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a 
statute is jurisdictional in nature and, therefore, we 
conclude that Defendant's facial challenge to the 
constitutionality of the communications fraud statute is 
not barred by his voluntary, unconditional guilty plea. 
However, in considering Defendant's facial challenge to 
the communications fraud statute on overbreadth and 
vagueness grounds, we conclude that it is not 
unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. Accordingly, 
we affirm Defendant's conviction. 
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ORME, Judge (concurring): 
**18 I concur in the court's opinion. I write separately 
to explain my position, because I recognize the lead 
opinion represents a departure from the general 
prohibition against raising issues for the first time on 
appeal, especially in the face of a guilty plea. 
**19 For me, the easy proposition is this: Subject 
matter jurisdiction is an issue that may be raised by 
either party or the court at any time. So far as I am 
aware, there is no exception to this rule for guilty pleas. 
See *741 James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998) ("[Subject matter jurisdiction] is derived 
from the law. It can neither be waived nor conferred by 
consent of the accused. Objection to the jurisdiction of 
the court over the subject matter may be urged at any 
stage of the proceedings, and the right to make such an 
objection is never waived.") (internal quotations & 
citation omitted), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 
1999). 
**20 In this sense, the lead opinion's analogy to 
sovereign immunity cases is actually pretty good. If a 
plaintiff sued the State without giving the required 
presuit notice, and the State did not raise the lack of 
notice as a defense below, it would presumably not be 
permitted to raise the lack of notice for the first time on 
appeal in challenging a judgment that had been entered 
against it. However, if giving the presuit notice is 
necessary to vest the court with subject matter 
jurisdiction, then of course the lack of notice could be 
raised for the first time on appeal. And indeed, giving 
presuit notice strictly in compliance with the sovereign 
immunity statute has been held to be a matter of subject 
matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit 
Auth, 2001 UT 109,11 16, 37 P.3d 1156. 
**21 While this kind of subject matter jurisdiction 
issue usually arises in civil cases, the concept is the 
same in criminal cases. If a guilty plea is entered, and 
no issues are reserved for appeal consistent with State 
v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah Ct.App.1988), then 
unless the guilty plea is set aside as involuntary, all 
issues are waived on appeal, except subject matter 
jurisdiction, which can never be waived. See James, 
965 P.2d at 570. Thus, if a 32-year-old defendant was 
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charged with murder in juvenile court and pled guilty, 
on appeal to this court he most certainly could 
challenge the lack of the juvenile court's subject matter 
jurisdiction over an adult charged with murder, see 
Utah Code Ann. § § 78-3a-104, -105 (Supp.2003)--even 
if the guilty plea was otherwise proper and he never 
raised the jurisdictional problem below. The same is 
true if a defendant pled guilty to the "crime" of 
blasphemy, and no such criminal offense were on the 
books in Utah. If he pled guilty, and did not raise below 
the point that no such crime existed in Utah, he still 
could challenge his conviction by raising, albeit for the 
first time on appeal, the lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. And obviously he would succeed. The 
trial court simply would lack the judicial power to 
convict the defendant of a nonexistent crime. 
**22 Here is where it gets admittedly more tricky: 
Suppose our criminal code made it a felony to commit 
the crime of blasphemy, defined as "disparaging the one 
Almighty God or questioning His existence." If a 
defendant pled guilty to that offense, did not preserve a 
constitutional challenge for appeal under Sery, and did 
not raise the constitutionality issue below, could he 
raise for the first time on appeal the facial 
unconstitutionality, under the First Amendment, of the 
statute criminalizing blasphemy? At one level, it seems 
that charges brought pursuant to such a statute would be 
just as much a nullity as charges brought, as in the 
immediately preceding hypothetical, in the complete 
absence of any blasphemy statute. In simplest terms, in 
this country there simply could be no crime of 
blasphemy~any statute purporting to provide otherwise 
would be facially unconstitutional. But he could not 
raise this constitutional challenge for the first time on 
appeal unless facial unconstitutionality goes to subject 
matter jurisdiction. TFN11 Does it? I am not 
completely sure, although I can see that, in concept, an 
unconstitutional statute is as ineffectual as no statute. 
FN1. Judge Bench points out such an 
argument could be reached under the plain 
error doctrine. Maybe. But the rescue 
opportunity provided by the plain error 
doctrine is rather limited. As hereafter shown, 
the ability to claim plain error can itself be 
waived. In contrast, subject matter 
jurisdiction can never be waived. In the 
blasphemy hypothetical, if facial 
unconstitutionality is a matter of subject 
matter jurisdiction, it could be addressed for 
the first time on appeal even if plain error was 
not raised, see State v. All Real Property, 
2004 UT App 232,1| 13 n. 7; was inadequately 
raised, see State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208-09 (Utah 1993) (holding that if any of 
the requirements for plain error are not met, 
"plain error is not established" and cannot be 
raised); or was raised too late. See Coleman 
v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98,11 9, 17 P.3d 1122 
(holding court would not reach unpreserved 
issues under plain error doctrine because plain 
error raised for first time in reply brief). 
*742 **23 This is what ultimately explains my vote in 
this case: No Utah appellate court has squarely 
answered the question of whether a challenge to a 
criminal statute based on facial unconstitutionality goes 
to subject matter jurisdiction. The lead opinion cites a 
multitude of cases that have held it does; Judge Bench's 
opinion cites no case that has addressed the question 
and held it does not. JFN2] It is admittedly somewhat 
counterintuitive for me thai a substantive conclusion of 
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y - - e v e n f a c i a l 
unconstitutionality-defeats subject matter jurisdiction, 
but that seems to be the prevailing view. Accordingly, 
with some trepidation, I concur in the court's opinion. 
FN2.1 disagree with Judge Bench's claim that 
Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, 94 P.3d 211, 
considered this question and rejected it on the 
merits. The Myers court described the 
jurisdictional argument asserted in the case as 
being "somewhat convoluted." Id. at If 15. 
Later, the Court characterized the argument as 
being tantamount to a "claim[ ] that the trial 
court's decision constituted an 'erroneous 
application of the law.'" Id atf 17 (citation 
omitted). In any event, the Court's dismissal 
of the jurisdictional argument in Myers was 
premised on the simplistic notion that " '[a] 
court has subject matter jurisdiction if the case 
is one of the type of cases the court has been 
empowered to entertain by the constitution or 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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statute from which the court derives its 
authority,' " id. at If 16 (citation omitted)~an 
obvious overstatement as readily shown by the 
sovereign immunity example, i.e., district 
courts have general civil jurisdiction and even 
jurisdiction over disputes against the State, but 
lack subject matter jurisdiction over such a 
case if the presuit notice is flawed in some 
way. Another example of the overbreadth of 
the pronouncement in Myers is the fact that 
appellate courts have the constitutional and 
statutory power to consider appeals, and yet 
are held to lack subject matter jurisdiction 
over appeals that are untimely. See Utah 
Const, art. VIII § 3 ("The Supreme Court shall 
have appellate jurisdiction over all other 
matters to be exercised as provided by statute 
...."); id. § 5 ("The jurisdiction of all other 
courts, both original and appellate, shall be 
provided by statute."); Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2(3) (2002) (specifying Supreme Court's 
appellate jurisdiction); id. § 78-2a-3(2) 
(specifying appellate jurisdiction of Court of 
Appeals); Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 
767 P.2d 569, 571 (Utah Ct.App.1989) ( 
"[Fjailure to file an appeal within the required 
time limit deprived the court of subject matter 
jurisdiction.") (citing Watson v. Anderson, 29 
Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003, 1004 (1973)). 
The very best indication that the Myers court 
simply did not have before it the issue we 
must decide—at least not in any kind of cogent, 
well-developed way-is that the only authority 
cited in Myers is two decisions from the Utah 
Court of Appeals and the statute giving the 
district courts original jurisdiction of "all 
matters civil and criminal," subject to certain 
limitations. Myers, 2004 UT 31 at If 16, 94 
P.3d 211 (quoting Utah Code Ann. $ 
78-3-4(0(2002)). The Myers opinion did not 
acknowledge, much less did it treat, the 
extensive state and federal jurisprudence 
categorizing the facial unconstitutionality of a 
criminal statute as being a matter of subject 
matter jurisdiction-a virtual impossibility if 
the argument had actually been made and was 
well-supported, as in the instant case. 
Page 11 
BENCH, Judge (concurring in the result): 
**24 I do not necessarily disagree with the main 
opinion's analysis of the constitutionality of the 
communications fraud statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-1801 (2003). But, because of the procedural 
posture of this case, I would rule that we cannot reach 
the issue under controlling Utah law. [FNII 
FN1. Given the clarity of the Utah law, 
decisions from the federal courts are not 
helpful. Nor are the federal cases even 
consistent with each other. See, e.g., United 
States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th 
Cir.1989) amended by 907 F.2d 115 (9th 
Cir.1990) ("The dividing line between the 
majority of constitutional claims waived by a 
voluntary plea of guilty, and those that 
challenge the right of the state to hale the 
defendant into court, and thus survive the plea 
..., has not been crystal-clear."). 
**25 As recognized by the main opinion, Defendant 
entered an unconditional guilty plea to three counts of 
communications fraud. Cf. State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 
939 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) (allowing defendants to enter 
conditional pleas preserving the right to appeal any 
specified pretrial ruling). In the district court, 
Defendant never challenged the constitutionality of the 
statute. Nor did he enter a conditional plea to preserve 
his right to appeal the constitutionality of the 
communications fraud statute. See id_ Furthermore, 
Defendant never filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,113, 40 P.3d 630 
(requiring defendant to file a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea within thirty days after the entry of the plea 
before defendant can challenge the validity of the guilty 
plea on appeal). Instead, Defendant filed a notice of 
appeal directly from his sentence. Now, for the first 
time, Defendant attempts to raise the issues of *743 
overbreadth and vagueness as constitutional 
challenges to the communications fraud statute. He 
claims he can do so because subject matter jurisdiction 
cannot be waived and that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to convict him of violating an 
unconstitutional statute. 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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**26 This approach reflects a basic misunderstanding 
of jurisdiction. The Utah Supreme Court recently 
explained subject matter jurisdiction very succinctly as 
follows: "A court has subject matter jurisdiction if the 
case is one of the type of cases the court has been 
empowered to entertain by the constitution or statute 
from which the court derives its authority." Myers v. 
State, 2004 UT 31,f 16, 94 P.3d 211 (other quotations 
and citation omitted); see also Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 
881 P.2d 844, 852 (Utah 1994) ("Subject matter 
jurisdiction is 'the authority and competency of the 
court to decide the case.'" (citations omitted)). 
**27 The main opinion contends that a facial 
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is 
necessarily a jurisdictional matter because the inherent 
constitutionality of a statute affects whether a court has 
the power and authority to decide the issue. However, 
without a proper challenge, courts must presume the 
constitutionality of a statute. 
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional until the 
contrary is clearly shown. It is only when statutes 
manifestly infringe upon some constitutional 
provision that they can be declared void. Every 
reasonable presumption must be indulged in and 
every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of 
constitutionality. 
Jones v. Board of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53,11 
10, 94 P.3d 283 (quotations and citations omitted). 
Thus, because the communications fraud statute was not 
challenged below, it is presumed to be constitutional, 
and the district court had jurisdiction. 
**28 In footnote two of the main opinion, my 
colleagues attempt to find support for their 
extraordinary decision by pointing to the distinction 
between general jurisdiction and subject matter 
jurisdiction. As noted by the main opinion, we do not 
focus "on whether subject matter jurisdiction exists in 
[this] particular context" because, unlike claims made 
against governmental entities—which require 
compliance with the Immunity Act—the 
communications fraud statute at issue here requires that 
nothing be done, by either party, before criminal 
defendants can be prosecuted and courts can exercise 
subject matter jurisdiction. With claims against a 
governmental entity, "the legislature has explicitly 
declared how, what, when, and to whom a party must 
direct and deliver a Notice in order to preserve his or 
her right to maintain an action against a governmental 
entity." Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109,Tf 
15, 37 P.3d 1156. Thus, "[compliance with the 
Immunity Act is necessary to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction upon a trial court to hear claims against 
governmental entities." Id. at^t 16. In the instant case, 
as with presumably every other criminal prosecution, 
the charging statute does not explicitly declare what 
must be done before subject matter jurisdiction is 
conferred. Thus, the district court had general 
jurisdiction as well as subject matter jurisdiction due to 
an absence of legislative requirements or limitations. 
[FN21 
FN2. In an attempt to bolster the main 
opinion's reasoning, the concurring opinion 
discusses some rather bizarre hypotheticals. 
First, the thirty-two-year-old defendant 
charged with murder in juvenile court. 
Thankfully, this potential calamity has already 
been resolved by our legislature. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-104, - 105(l)(a) (2002) 
(detailing jurisdiction of juvenile courts). By 
contrast, our legislature has not limited the 
jurisdiction of district courts in a similar 
manner. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) 
(2002) ("The district court has original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, 
not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not 
prohibited by law."). Second, the criminal 
defendant who pleads guilty to the nonexistent 
crime of blasphemy. If no such crime of 
blasphemy existed, then we would not indulge 
in the presumption that a nonexistent, 
unwritten statute was constitutional. Here, 
however, a statute does exist, and, until 
challenged, we must presume it to be 
constitutional. Third, if a defendant pleaded 
guilty to the theoretical crime of blasphemy, 
and did not preserve his constitutional 
challenge, then he could raise the challenge 
for the first time on appeal by arguing plain 
error. A plain error challenge could easily be 
made without making the facial 
constitutionality of a statute a prerequisite to 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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subject matter jurisdiction. 
As for the concurring opinion's statement that 
"[n]o Utah appellate court has squarely 
answered the question of whether a challenge 
based on facial unconstitutionality goes to 
subject matter jurisdiction," our supreme court 
has squarely addressed the question. In Myers 
v. State, 2004 UT 31, 94 P.3d 211, the Utah 
Supreme Court explained that even when 
Myers argued, for the first time on appeal, that 
the wholly and facially unconstitutional 
aggravated murder statute divested the trial 
court of jurisdiction, he had "failed to state 
any legitimate jurisdictional defect" because 
"[t]he Utah Code provides that 'the district 
court has original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah 
Constitution and not prohibited by law.1" Id. 
at H 16 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-
4(1)). The instant case is no different. Thus, 
even when Norris argues, for the first time on 
appeal, that the communications fraud statute 
is facially unconstitutional, and that such 
unconstitutionality goes to the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the district court, he fails "to 
state any legitimate jurisdictional defect." 
Myers, 2004 UT 31 at f 16, 94 P.3d 211. 
*744 **29 Therefore, if Defendant wanted to 
challenge the constitutionality of the communications 
fraud statute, he had to do so first in the district court. 
See, e.g., State v. Puzmire, 898 P.2d 271, 272 (Utah 
Ct.App.1995) ("Although [defendant] raises the issue 
on appeal, he did not challenge the constitutionality of 
this statutory scheme before the trial court. As a 
general rule, we will not consider issues-including 
constitutional issues-initially raised on appeal."); State 
v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah Ct.App.1990) ("As the 
Utah appellate courts have reiterated many times, we 
generally will not consider an issue, even a 
constitutional one, which the appellant raises on appeal 
for the first time."). 
**30 This rule applies with equal force to facial 
challenges to a statute made for the first time on appeal. 
In State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991), when a facial challenge to a criminal 
statute was raised for the first time on appeal, this court 
addressed Archambeau's challenge only for the "plain 
error" and "exceptional circumstances" arguments he 
made. See Archambeau, 820 P.2d at 922, 926. 
Defendant, in the instant appeal, asserts no claim of 
plain error or exceptional circumstances. 
**31 Allowing defendants to raise constitutional 
challenges for the first time on appeal will logically 
necessitate overruling a large body of jurisdictional 
jurisprudence involving Utah's justice courts. See, e.g., 
City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513, 517 
(Utah 1990) ("[T]his Court [has] repeatedly held that a 
person dissatisfied with a justice court decision could 
appeal that decision to a district court and that the 
district court decision was final unless the validity or 
constitutionality of a statute was at issue, not on appeal, 
but in the lower court."); Draper City v. Roper, 2003 
UT App 312,11 2, 78 P.3d 631 (per curiam) (" 'The 
decision of the district court [from a hearing de novo 
following a justice court's ruling] is final and may not 
be appealed unless the district court rules on the 
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.' " (quoting 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120(7))): South Salt Lake City 
v. Terkelson, 2002 UT App 405,11 6, 61 P.3d 282 
("Utah case law clearly provides that neither this court 
nor the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear an 
appeal from proceedings in the district court held 
pursuant to an appeal from the justice court unless the 
issues raised in the justice court involve[ ] the validity 
or constitutionality of an ordinance or statute." 
(quotations and citations omitted)); City ofKanab v. 
Guskey. 965 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Utah Ct.App.1998) 
("[Historically, Utah appellate courts have never had 
jurisdiction to hear appeals of district court decisions 
after a de novo trial on appeal from an unfavorable 
justice court judgment, absent the raising of a 
constitutional challenge in the justice court."). The 
practical consequence of the main opinion is that 
defendants will now be allowed to challenge the 
constitutionality of a statute in this court, for the first 
time, without ever having bothered to raise the issue in 
either justice or district court. 
**32 Having failed below to challenge the statute on 
grounds of overbreadth and vagueness, and having 
failed on appeal to argue either plain error or 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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exceptional circumstances, Defendant is now precluded 
from challenging the constitutionality of the 
communications fraud statute. I would therefore affirm 
based on Defendant's failure to preserve his 
constitutional challenge. 
97 P.3d 732, 506 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,2004 UT App 267 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Keith L. Stoney (3868) 
City Prosecutor 
West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley Citv, UT 84119 
(801) 963-3331 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH (WVC) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
NORRIS, RICHARD F. 
678 WILLIAMSBURG 
SANDY, UTAH 
5/15/55 
Defendant. 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. C\ i\ { 0 0 4 3 ^ 1 mCL; 
The undersigned, KEITH L. STONEY, under oath, states on 
information and belief that the defendant, on or about 12 MAY 1994, 
at the vicinity of 3392 WEST 3500 SOUTH, West Valley City, Utah, 
did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of: 
COUNT 1: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A" 
COUNT 2: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A" 
COUNT 3: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A" 
COUNT 4: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 76-10-1801, CLASS "A" 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: 
MICHAEL MABRY 
BONNIE GESSEL 
JOAN MATTSON 
KAYLYNN CROSBY 
LISA STAUFFER 
SHERRY FRANCIS 
DOUG FAY 
xi 
DETECTIVE PLOTNICK**PLEASE LET US KNOW IF THERE ARE ADDITIONAL 
WITNESSES** 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases this information on the following: 
WITNESSES STATED TO OFFICERS, THE DEFENDANT ON FOUR DIFFERENT 
OCCASIONS UNLAWFULLY DEFRAUDED ANOTHER OR OBTAINED FROM ANOTHER, 
MS^EY PROPERTY, OR ANYTHING OF VALUE BY MEANS OF FALSE OR 
FRAUDULENT PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, PROMISES, OR MATERIAL 
OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH ANY PERSON 
BY A S M^NSFOR THE PURPOSE OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME; 
TOE^FENDANT HAS NO BUSINESS LICENSE TO OBERATE IN WEST VALLEY AND 
N S C U ^ E N T RESIDENCE. THE DEFENDANTJ^^REABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN, 
THEREFORE, THE CITY REQUESTS A WARRANT^OF ARREST. 
Complain 
94-25376, DR. HORRIS.K-Z 
PTC: , 
D«cmu>er 19, 1994 
Xll 
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00622 
Keith L. Stoney (3868) 
Valerie J. O'Brien (6624) 
David L. Clark (6199) 
City Prosecutor 
West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
(801) 963-3344 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH (WVC) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
NORRIS, RICHARD F. 
6 78 WILLIAMSBURG 
SANDY, UTAH 
5/15/55 
Defendant. 
A M E N D E D 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. 941004929 
The undersigned, KEITH L. STONEY, under oath, states on 
information and belief that the defendant, on or about MARCH, APRIL 
AND/OR MAY OF 1993, at the vicinity of 3392 WEST 3500 SOUTH, West 
Valley City, Utah, did unlawfully commit the crime(s) of: 
COUNT 1: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS 
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH, 
APRIL OR MAY OF 19 9 3 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR 
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING 
MORE THAN $30 0.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, 
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND 
INDIRECTLY TO MICHAEL MABRY BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME. 
COUNT 2: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS 
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH, 
APRIL CR MAY OF 19 9 3 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR 
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING 
MORE THAN $300.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, 
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND 
xui 
INDIRECTLY TO JOAN MATTSON BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME. 
COUNT 3: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS 
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH, 
APRIL OR MAY OF 19 9 3 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR 
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING 
MORE THAN $300.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, 
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND 
INDIRECTLY TO LISA STAUFFER BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME. 
COUNT 4: COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, SECTION 76-10-1801 U.C.A. 1953 AS 
AMENDED, CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR, RICHARD NORRIS IN MARCH, 
APRIL OR MAY OF 19 9 3 DEVISED A SCHEME TO DEFRAUD OR 
OBTAIN MONEY, PROPERTY OR ANYTHING OF VALUE, TOTALING 
MORE THAN $300.00, BY FALSE PRETENSES, REPRESENTATIONS, 
PROMISES, OR OMISSIONS AND COMMUNICATED DIRECTLY AND 
INDIRECTLY TO SUSAN HUNTER BY ANY MEANS FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF EXECUTING OR CONCEALING THE SCHEME. 
This information 
following witnesses: 
is based on evidence obtained from the 
MICHAEL MABRY 
BONNIE GESSEL 
JOAN MATTSON 
KAYLYNN CROSBY 
LISA STAUFFER 
SHERRY FRANCIS 
DOUG FAY 
DETECTIVE PLOTNICK**PLEASE 
WITNESSES** 
SUSAN HUNTER 
LET US KNOW IF THERE ARE ADDITIONAL 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases this information on the following: 
RICHARD NORRIS PLACED A NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT FOR A $1400.00 A 
2 
xiv 
MONTH SALARIED, WITH BENEFITS, POSITION FOR A DIET COUNSELOR, WHEN, 
IN FACT, THE POSITION HE WAS OFFERING TO THE VICTIM WAS NOT A 
POSITION OF THAT NATURE OR THE NATURE ADVERTISED OR SOLICITED OR 
PROMISED SUCH THAT: 
A. THE POSITION WAS NOT A SALARIED JOB WITH BENEFITS, OR 
B. THE POSITION WAS NOT AS A DIET COUNSELOR, OR 
C. THE POSITION WAS FOR COMMISSIONED SALES OF A DIET PRODUCT, OR 
D. THE CONTRACT MR. NORRIS REQUIRED WAS NOT, WHAT HE SAID IT WAS 
FOR AND AMOUNTED TO A DEBT OF OVER $309 TO EACH VICTIM THAT 
SIGNED IT, OR 
E. THE DIET PRODUCT WAS NOT A DIET PRODUCT, OR 
F. THE DIET PRODUCT WAS NOT APPROVED AS A DIET PRODUCT, OR 
G. THE AMOUNT OF PRODUCT SOLD TO THE VICTIM WAS MORE THAN THE 
AMOUNT AGREED UPON BY AND PROMISED BY MR. NORRIS, HENCE THE 
DEBT WAS GREATER THAN INTENDED 
H. MR. NORRIS, AFTER THE SALE, WOULD NOT ACCEPT RETURNS OF THE 
PRODUCT AS PREVIOUSLY INSINUATED, PROMISED OR AGREED, OR 
I. MR. NORRIS KNEW THAT THE PRODUCT WAS NOT WHAT HE STATED IT 
WAS, OR 
J. MR. NORRIS USED THIS SCHEME KNOWING PEOPLE COULD NOT LIVE UP 
TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONTRACT, OR 
K. MR. NORRIS, KNOWING THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE OBLIGATION OF THE 
VICTIMS, USED THIS SCHEME TO SUE THE VICTIMS TO MAKE MONEY FOR 
HIS COMPANY, OR 
L. MR. NORRIS, KNOWING THE IMPOSSIBILITY 0F~THE OBLIGATION OF THE 
VICTIM, USED THIS SCHEME TO SUE THFjy-VTCT?IMS FOR THE FALSE 
VALUES OF THE PRODUCT.. 
Complainant: 
/dibits-
Q4-25376, DR/CP, HORRIS.R2 
PTC: , 
Ocnober 2, 1995 
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ERNIE W. JONES, 1736 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
6^ 9 ?m 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RICHARD F. NORRIS 
AKA 
OTN 
Defendant. 
DOB 05/15/1955, 
Screened by: EW Jones 
Assigned to: EW Jones 
BAIL: $75,000.00 
Warrant/Release: Non-Jail 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. 9616 70 *(£ F 
The undersigned Brook Plotnick - West Valley City Police Department, under oatn states 
on information and belief that the defendant committed the crimes of: 
COUNT I 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or_artjfice to defraud 
another or to_obtain^from anothgr^ money or anythingj)f^ value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
xvi 
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COUNT II 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT III 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
xvn 
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COUNTV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT IX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT X 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
another or to obtain from another money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
B. Plotnick; S. Humphrey; B. Gessel; J. Mattson; S. Hunter; K. Crosby; M. Mabry; L. 
Stauffer; K. Utley; S. Francis; G. Fowler; K. Noland; D. Duffin and S. Lebaron. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your Affiant bases this Information on police report #94-25376 and the following: 
1. During the Spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisement in the newspaper. 
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment 
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant 
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The 
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtained judgments against many of 
these people. 
2. The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to 
fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to 
cover up this scheme. 
BROOK PLOTNICK, Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
day of October, 1996. 
MAGISTRATE 
Authorized for presentment>and filing: 
E. NEAL GUrWARSOr^Dj'strict Attorney 
Deput/District Attorney' October 1, 1996 
jp/96016093 / 
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ERNIE W.JONES, 1736 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
ROLL CALL ±^323°° 
JUDGE LS&J&Z-
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RICHARD F. NORRIS 
AKA 
OTN 
Defendant. 
DOB 05/15/1955, 
Screened by: EW Jones 
Assigned to: EW Jones 
BAIL: $75,000.00 
Warrant/Release: Non-Jail 
A M E N D E D 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
CaseNo. 9 7 1 O O S & < f £ F $ 
The undersigned Brook Plotnick - West Valley City Police Department, under oath states 
on information and belief that the defendant committed the crimes of: 
COUNT I 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Joan Mattson or to obtain from another Joan Mattson or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT II 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Mike Mabry or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT III 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Kay Utley or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Chris Atkin or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of false 
or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT V 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Randy Hunter or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud Joy 
Slotsvic or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Kay Loemon or to obtain from Kay Loemon money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT VIII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Sherry Francis or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Sherry Bailey or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT X 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about May of 1993, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, 
Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to defraud 
Sue Hunter or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
B. Plotnick; S. Humphrey; B. Gessel; J. Mattson; S. Hunter; K. Crosby; M. Mabry; L. 
Stauffer; K. Utley; S. Francis; G. Fowler; K. Noland; D. Duffin and S. Lebaron. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your Affiant bases this Information on police report #94-25376 and the following: 
1. During the Spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisement in the newspaper. 
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment 
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant 
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The 
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtained judgments against many of 
these people. 
2. The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to 
fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to 
cover up this scheme. „ . r \ ^ ~ ^ — ^ 
BROOK PLOTNICK, Affiant 
Subscribed 
day of 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON, District Attorney 
V 
"0BERT K. WIDER 
Deputy DistricyAttorney, March 27, 1997 
jp/96016093 
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Data Table for Initial Criminal Filing 
Prosecuting governmental entity: Salt Lake County 
Prior related cases: None 
Officer's Badge No. 8049 
Agency Case Number: 94-25376 
Arrest Date: 
Jail Booking Number: 
Defendant's Sex: Male 
Defendant's Social Security Number: 
Defendant's Driver's License Number: 8223961 
State Issuing Defendant's Driver's License: Ut 
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E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ERNEST W. JONES, 1736 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION II 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RICHARD F. NORRIS 
DOB 05/15/55, 
OTN 
Defendant. 
Screened by: E. Jones 
Assigned to: E. Jones 
BAIL: $150,000.00 
Warrant/Release: Non-Jail 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. 97l£>D8^> f g 
The undersigned Brook Plotnick - West Valley City Police Department, under oath states 
on information and belief that the defendant, committed the (ftimeis of: 
COUNT I t l f ^ - l l / 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a TkmHTSgreeTelony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
XXVll 
r\c\r\nn 
INFORMATION 
STATE OF UTAH v. RICHARD F. NORRIS 
DAONo. 97006614 
Page 2 
COUNT II 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.09. j 
COUNT III X ^ ^ ' ^ / 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third D e ^ > e l ^ n y , at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
xxvin 
0000.? 
INFORMATION 
STATE OF UTAH v. RICHARD F. NORRIS 
DAONo. 97006614 
Page 3 
COUNT V 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT VIII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT X 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Randy Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT XI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XIII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Lemmon money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
XXXI 
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COUNT XIV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Lemmon money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XVI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Francis money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT XVII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XVIII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sherry Bailey money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XVIIII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT XX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party to the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme, artifice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Officer Brook Plotnick, S. Humphrey, B. Gessel, Joan Mattson, Sue Hunter, Kay Crosby, 
Mike Mabry, L. Stauffer, Kay Utley, S. Francis, O. Fowler, K. Noland, D. Duffin and S. 
Lebaron. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your Affiant bases this Information on police report #94-25376 and the following: 
1. During the Spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisement in the newspaper. 
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment 
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant 
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The 
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtained judgments against many of 
these people. 
2. The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to 
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fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to 
cover up this scheme. 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
BROOK PLOTNICK 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to 
day of May, 1997. j ' cf- • < • x ^ 
.r /<-
MAGISTRATE 
J? 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON, T^istrict Attorney 
4-< / / y^i^~ ' pL><-£^/ 
Deputy District Attorpfey 
May 15, 1997 
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Data Table for Initial Criminal Filing 
Prosecuting governmental entity: Salt Lake County 
Prior related cases: none 
Officer's Badge No. 8049 
Agency Case Number: 94-25376 
Arrest Date: 
Jail Booking Number: 
Defendant's Sex: Male 
Defendant's Social Security Number: 
Defendant's Driver's License Number: 8223961 
State Issuing Defendant's Driver's License: Utah 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
ERNEST W.JONES, 1736 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801-363-7900 
riuo uis 
Third Judk 
iCOURT 
District 
By. 
APR 16 1999 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RICHARD F. NORMS 
DOB 5/15/55 
Defendant. 
A M E N D E D 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. 971008355FS 
The undersigned Ernest W. Jones, Deputy District Attorney, 
information and belief that the defendant committed the crime of: 
under oath states on 
COUNT I 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
'JVM 
COUNT II 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joan Mattson money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT III 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of false 
of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, as a 
party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means for 
the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of the 
loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Mike Mabry money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
xxxvm 
00219 
COUNTV 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT VI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Kay Utley money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00„ 
COUNT VII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT VIII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Chris Atkin money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT IX 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT X 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Joy Slotsvic money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
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COUNT XI 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00. 
COUNT XII 
COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD, A Third Degree Felony, at 3392 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Sate of Utah, on or about March through June 1993, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 10, Section 1801(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, RICHARD F. NORRIS, a party to the offense, devised a scheme or artifice to 
defraud another or to obtain from Sue Hunter money or anything of value by means of 
false of fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who, 
as a party ot the offense, communicated directly or indirectly with a person by any means 
for the prupose of executing or concealing the scheme, aritice or fraud, and the value of 
the loss or the thing sought to be obtained is over $1,000.00, 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Officer Brook Plotnick, Officer Steve Humphrey, B. Gessel, Joan Mattson, Sue Hunter, 
Kay Crosby, Mike Mabry, L. Stauffer, Kay Utley, S. Francis, O. Fowler, K. Noland, D. 
Duffin and S. Labaron. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases this Information on police report no. 94-25376 and the following: 
1. During the spring of 1993, the defendant ran an advertisment in the newspaper. 
The ad made certain promises and representations to those responding concerning employment 
and salary. Numerous people responded to the ad and met with the defendant. The defendant 
had each person sign an agreement with him. The defendant did not deliver as promised. The 
defendant then sued each person for over $1,000.00 and obtaine djudgments against many of 
these people. 
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2. The defendant told several employees at his business that he never intended to 
fulfill any of the promises in the ad. The defendant back dated checks and altered records to 
cover up this scheme. 
ERNESf W. JONES 
Affiant 
Subscribed an<Lm£$fttyfl>| 
day of April, 
( / ^ 1 ^ - A r 
MAGISTRAL 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
DAVID E. YOCOM, District Attorney 
Deputy District Attorney 
amended April 5, 1999 
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